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Abstract
This thesis examines how global and local governance has combined to deliver effective and
sustainable public transportation in cities by comparing Bogotá’s bus rapid transit (BRT) system,
TransMilenio, with Medellín’s mass transit system, STIMVA, often referred to as Metro de
Medellín. After considering the rationales used to justify local and global authority over climate
change, this analysis problematizes the supposed benefits of empowering global and local actors
by highlighting the conflicts of interest that plague the elites who mediate the global and the
local. In analyzing the global and local interactions, this work draws from extensive literature to
highlight three potential risks of global governance that inhibit the benefits of empowering local
actors to govern on climate change issues. The technocratic risk, where global actors encourage
local governments to emphasize technical planning to the detriment of reading local opinion, the
political risk, when political leaders hinge their careers on the transport system while also
drawing on global validation that sets the system on precarious ground, and the neoliberal risk,
where cities brand themselves to the point of emphasizing symbolic over systemic change in
order to compete in the global capital market. Examining these risks helps to explain how the
presence of multilateral governance during the creation of TransMilenio may have contributed to
the lack of local support for the system as mayors relied too heavily on the political authority and
technocratic rationales of global institutions. In contrast, the cases of Medellín and the Enrique
Peñalosa’s second term in Bogotá, showcase the neoliberal risk as the multilevel governance
system promotes city branding and empowers elite and private actors.
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Chapter One
Introduction
A Brief History of Global Climate Change Governance
At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, local
authorities and subnational actors were identified as key stakeholders with a direct link to the
public and ability to govern climate change for the first time.1 By 1993, the International
Alliance of Local Governments for Sustainability created the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP)
and by the 2000s, multiple transnational municipal networks (C40, Covenant of Mayors, Cities
for Climate Protection) formed to tackle issues that the United Nations (UN) struggled to find
consensus and motivate to change.2 The emergence of cities as key partners in climate change
governance not only represented a shift in the global governance system, but also raised new
questions about what the role of these cities would be.
In the 1980s and 1990s, climate change governance adhered largely to a multilateral
model of global governance. The multilateral model was hierarchical and functioned through the
accepted authority of nation states who used treaties to make international law that translated
back to national regulation and to local action.3 Institutions like the World Bank, the United
Nations (UN), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) were all central actors during
this period who gained their capital and authority from nation states that were the centers of
power. The rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s began a slow “hollowing out of government,”

1

Liliana Andonova, Governance Entrepreneurs: International Organizations and the Rise of Global Public-Private
Partnerships, Business and Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
2
Jennifer Bansard, Phillip Pattberg, and Oscar Widerberg, “Cities to the Rescue? Assessing the Performance of
Transnational Municipal Networks in Global Climate Governance.” International Environmental Agreements 17
(2016): 229-246.
3
Harriet Bulkeley, Liliana Andonova, Michele M. Betsill, Daniel Compagnon, Thomas Hale, Matthew J. Hoffmann,
Peter Newell, Matthew Paterson, Charles Roger, and Stacy D. VanDeveer, Transnational Climate Change
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107706033.
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given that neoliberal economic policies promoted by the Washington Consensus focused on
privatization, austerity, deregulation, free trade, and reductions in government spending.4 Unable
to provide goods as easily, national governments began to lose their authority and private actors
used this shift to form new alliances and push for further deregulation. As the overlap in dates
suggests, this process was by no means linear or all encompassing.
In this new context, scholars like Foucault began to ask how actors could govern without
the legal authority derived from the nation state and conceptualized less hierarchical, more
networked form of governance.5 Foucault’s term, governmentality, any activity meant to shape,
guide, or affect the conduct of citizens, helped explain the potential role of new subnational
actors by expanding the idea of what it means to govern. Building on Foucault, the neoliberal
world order did not mean less government, but just meant more governmentality as the state
hollowed out and non-state actors gain new influence.6 To understand how new actors exercised
governmentality, scholars like Weiss look at how actors constructed legitimacy based on a “logic
of appropriateness,” where compliance can come from self-imposed obligation to do the “right”
thing, which is determined by a socially constructed understanding of what is right.7 This logic
of appropriateness undergirded the rise of normative governance and soft-law mechanisms such
as goal setting, prize giving, and benchmarking. While this new model of global governance has
many possible names, Hooghe and Marks’ multilevel governance, provides the best base for
understanding the new system. Their conception of multilevel governance developed in response
to the emergence of the European Union (EU) and looks beyond levels (national, local, global) to
4

Peter Brand, “Green Subjection: The Politics of Neoliberal Urban Environmental Management,” International
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 31, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 616–32, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14682427.2007.00748.x.
5
Rosenau, J. N., & Czempiel, E.-O. (1992). Governance without government: Order and change in world politics.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
6
Peter Brand, “Green Subjection: The Politics of Neoliberal Urban Environmental Management”
7
T.G. Weiss, Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? (Malden: Polity Press, 2013).
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observe the multiple spheres of governance where climate change governance takes place.8 They
argue that multilevel governance is both a means to achieve collective benefits by coordinating
activity and an expression of community, given that citizens care about who gets to exercise
authority over them.9 The ability to govern climate change issues was not only shaped by these
systems, but helped to shape them by providing actors with a moral rationale for expanding their
authority.
Bulkeley and Betsill built on this multilevel model to include non-state actors like civil
society organizations or private companies and emphasize that governance takes place
simultaneously at multiple vertical levels (local, national, and global) and horizontal levels (citycity, government-business). In the climate change context, these multilevel governance
structures led to new fields of literature on transnational climate change governance (TCCG) and
urban climate change governance. Urban climate change governance examines the multilevel
governance climate change using municipalities as the central actor.10 A newer field,
transnational climate change governance draws from fields like urban climate change
governance. In Bulkeley et al.’s work on TCCG, the authors define it as “a collection of
individual initiatives: a mode of governance that is networked, decentralized, self-organized, and
often simultaneously public and private, global and local.”11 As the seminal text on TCCG

8

Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 01 (January 2009): 1,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000409.
9
Ibid.
10
Harriet Bulkeley, Vanesa Castán Broto, and Gareth A.S. Edwards, An Urban Politics of Climate Change:
Experimentation and the Governing of Socio-Technical Transitions (London, UK: Routledge, 2015).
11
Harriet Bulkeley et al., Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107706033.
This book, TCCG, published by ten of the most prominent climate change governance and multilevel governance
scholars in 2014, is the first to coin the term TCCG and as the seminal work in this emerging field, is the key text I
turn to in my analysis.
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published by ten of the most prominent scholars in related fields, when I write “TCCG” I am
generally referring to this book.
As neoliberal theories began to shape the world, environmentalism simultaneously gained
ground on the international stage and the 1987 Brundtland Report codified the need to promote
“sustainable development” that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs.”12 Combining environmentalism with economic
development made the idea of transferring capital to the global south palatable to wealthier
nations.13 The rise of environmentalism alongside the reorganization of state power and the
structural economic changes brought on by neoliberalism gave rise to a set of theories including
liberal environmentalism, the marketisation of environmental governance, and green
governmentality.14 These concepts link environmentalism with the construction of new modes of
governance that, following Foucault, work at a distance through the internalization of norms of
government via technical rules and devices focused on accountability.15 These links between
environmentalism, governmentality, multilevel governance, and neoliberalism are important both
for understanding the focus on urban climate change and the potential negative impacts of these
new governing systems. For instance, the focus on urban infrastructure in climate change action

12

Brundtland, G. (1987). Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future.
http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf
13
I recognize this term as problematic; however, its widely used and therefore the most intuitive term in the context
of this literature. Additionally, using this term reminds the reader that this literature is situated within a certain
ideology with inherent biases encapsulated by the use of terms like the “global south.”
14
Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance.
15
Michel Foucault, “Governmentality”, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds) The Foucault effect: studies in
governmentality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 87 – 104.
The term “accountability” is also problematic in this context given that it does not articulate who is being held
accountable to whom and often backgrounds the uneven power dynamics in the global system.
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has been explained by the urban political economy as central focus for capital accumulation.16
This link problematizes the narrative that cities will successfully engage in urban climate change
experiments if given the increased autonomy and power that comes from their position as key
climate change governors. This linkage also has the potential to draw resources away from rural
areas that already struggle with lower institutional capacity and resources.
Still, creating more sustainable cities is integral to successful global climate change
action. The UNEP estimated that cities produce around 70% of greenhouse gas emissions, use
80% of global energy, and consume 75% of natural resources.17As the main consumers of
resources, producers of pollution, and the home of over 55% of the global population, urban
areas should be at the forefront of sustainability and climate change.18 Of course, climate change
governance is widely understood as a global issue given the nature of environmental problems as
global public good issues that are subject to the challenges of under provision and overuse
because no single actor has an interest in unilaterally preserving resources or preventing
pollution.19 Given these realities and the shift away from a multilateral global governance system
towards a multilevel system that empowers subnational actors, the global and local levels of
governance emerge as dual keys to successful environmental action. Barber captures an ideal
climate change governance system in describing the miracle of civic “glocality” that promises
pragmatism instead of politics, innovation rather than ideology and solutions in place of
sovereignty.”20

16

Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance.
Bansard, et al. “Cities to the Rescue? Assessing the Performance of Transnational Municipal Networks in Global
Climate Governance”
18
United Nations, “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision,” (2018), http://ieu.unal.edu.co/centroeditorial/publicacionesieu/itemlist/category/17-documentos.
19
Robert Keohane, “Beyond the tragedy of the commons.” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2, (2010), 577–580.
20
Bansard, et al. “Cities to the Rescue? Assessing the Performance of Transnational Municipal Networks in Global
Climate Governance.”
17
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While “glocality” in climate change governance could be miraculous in overcoming the
geopolitical impediments to pursuing a global climate change agenda and the importance of both
local and global actors for motivating climate change actions has been well documented, the
literature often does not highlight how these levels of governance should work together or what
the optimal mix of global and local influence might be for different actors.21 This gap brings us
to our central question: what is the ideal mix (both amount and type) of global and local
governance when governing urban climate change issues?
Using the public transportation systems in Bogotá and Medellín as case studies, I will
explore how the different types of global and local interactions involved in the cities’
transportation systems affect their long-term sustainability. I argue that working more closely
with multilateral global governance institutions, characteristic of the 1980s and 1990s, creates a
more successful climate change project from a technical standpoint, but can result in negative
social and political outcomes that inhibit the long-term sustainability of the system. On the other
hand, when local actors appeal to a wider range f global actors in the multilevel governance
system, characteristic of the 2000s, cities risk emphasizing symbolic action to the point of
discouraging or impeding real action, in the form of new programs or policies, and allowing
elites to continue profiting from unsustainable production models by constructing a narrative of
individual responsibility while decreasing public and private accountability.22 These findings do
not necessarily give a precise definition of the ideal type and scope of global and local authority
over climate change action. However, they do move us closer to understanding the implications
of different governance tactics and the role of global and local actors.

21

When I reference “global actors” I am referring to any actor that cannot be categorized as national or local
including multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, national aid programs working in other
countries (USAID), and more traditional international institutions.
22
Peter Brand, “Green Subjection: The Politics of Neoliberal Urban Environmental Management”
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Case Selection
To contextualize these ideas, I will examine the public transportation systems in Bogotá
and Medellín for insights into the mix of global and local control. This case study will address a
few key gaps in the research. While scholars, such as G.C. Homsy, study how diverse cities
within a nation respond to national climate change policy, and others including, Bulkeley and
Bansard, study the broader patterns and individual cases of global-local climate governance. Yet,
few explore how global institutions interact with different cities in the same country. This
omission is partly due to the fact that few developing countries (more often the target of classic
international governance) have two cities of comparable political and economic status. While
Medellín with approximately 2.5 million inhabitants is much smaller than Bogotá at just over 8
million, the two cities have a long history of competition and power struggles in the country that
make them an interesting case comparison especially given how close they are to each other on
many global scales. By doing a close comparison of two cities in same country in the global
south with similar economic and political capital, I can more accurately separate out the effects
of global-local interactions from those of national-local or national-global policies.23
In general, transportation has been understudied in the context of urban environmentalism
because, unlike Bulkley and Bestill’s urban climate change experiments, many transport projects
arise to solve different problems, as is the case in Bogotá and Medellín. Despite often arising to
solve other urban crises, transportation provides a valuable case study due to its positive
environmental effects, its need for intensive capital and infrastructure investments, and its impact
on equality and development. Transport projects are also important and visible political projects
for local governments, so while neither TransMilenio nor Metro de Medellín started as a climate

23

This separation is of course, imperfect, and does not fully take into account differences like the intense violence
experienced by Medellín.
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change projects, we see climate change increase in importance as local actors realize the value
climate change can provide to their constructed authority, especially in global markets.24 This
evolution gets at the crux of the issue: understanding how local politicians and city elite navigate
the conflicts of interest between global and local groups.
Finally, these cities provide particularly powerful changes in “globalness” both across
time and between the two cities. Bogotá exhibits a multilateral governance presence as the World
Bank and IDB were heavily involved in the development of the city’s bus rapid transit system,
TransMilenio, in 1998. Conversely, Medellín’s Metro de Medellín received a loan from a
Spanish-German consortium and has almost no multilateral involvement. As a capital city and
one of the less violent areas, Bogotá entered into the multilateral global system as a subnational
partner prior to Medellín. However, after 2008, Medellín exerted a conscious effort to increase
its “globalness” and has since received significant international attention. Finally, Enrique
Peñalosa’s second term as Bogotá’s mayor in 2016 showed a renewed global engagement that
adhered to Medellín’s use of city branding and drew heavily from the city’s success in that area.
These changes over time in global and local orientation allow us to examine the effect of global
interactions versus local constructions of transportation systems between the two cities.

Project Overview: Key Differences in Outcomes
In both cities, the aspects of the transportation systems that are the most successful in
terms of local praise and in terms of global praise, are those that started prior to an increase the
marked increases in globalness and are rhetorically linked to local groups. For Bogotá this means
that the bike infrastructure and CicloRutas, are more beloved and more successful than
24

While the proper title for the Metro de Medellín is Sistema Integrado de Transporte masivo del Valle de Aburra
(STIMVA), I will use Metro de Medellín interchangeably.
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TransMilenio. For Medellín, the Metro de Medellín has a great reputation and strong support
while the newer bike system promoted largely by actors with global links has had trouble
catching on.
Each system succeeds in some aspects of increasing sustainability and fails in others as
seen in Table 1. While both projects have successfully reduced air pollution over time in the
cities, their ability to decrease car and motorcycle use appears to have declined. From 2007 to
2016, Bogotá reduced the concentration of particles from 71.6 to 50.25 In Medellín, motorcycle
use has increased significantly and in Bogotá, the number of cars increased by 21% between
2014 and 2017. Table 2 provides a full summary of changes in the principal mode of transport in
each city. In both cities, they are currently placing an emphasis on reducing car use; however,
Bogotá and Peñalosa placed a particularly high premium on the idea and their goal for the system
is that even the wealthiest citizen to take pride in using the public transport.26
Looking at the two cities, Medellín appears to struggle with lower transparency and less
integration between the public mass transit and other forms of sustainable transportation (bikes
and pedestrian paths). Bogotá on the other hand struggles with maintaining local support for
TransMilenio and creating a cultura ciudadana, a sense of civic duty and community, as well as
poor fleet quality. Both cities have seen a rise in car and motorcycle use.

25
26

“Informe de Calidad de Vida” BogotáComoVamos.org (2017).
Ortiz, Andres. Interview with Eleanor Jackson. Bogotá, January 2019.
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Table 1: Key Aspects of Sustainability in Public Transportation

Air Pollution
(Overall Measure)

Bogotá

Medellín

Decreased

Decreased

Car/Motorcycle Use Car use continues to rise

Motorcycle use has risen drastically

Fleet Sustainability

Highly sustainable

Introduction of diesel fleet adds to
an already unsustainable fleet

Environmental
Increasing environmental
Messaging/Activism consciousness

Low environmental consciousness,
higher among wealthy

Community
Creation

Efforts to increase, but low overall

Strong social cohesion and identity
creation, highly linked to Metro

Integration with
Other Transport

Higher, bike routes have been
extremely successful

Low, while the STIMVA system is
very integrated, private buses and
bikes are not

Source: Eleanor Jackson
Table 2: Transportation in Each City
Metro/TransMi

Private Bus27

Car

Motorcycle

Bike/Foot

Medellín 200628

13%

47%

8%

10%

16%

Medellín 2012

13%

42%

11%

18%

9%29

Medellín 2018

34%30

29%

7%

16%

8% (1% Bike)

Bogotá 200231

13%

51%

14%

1%

16%

Bogotá 322010

23%

46%

10%

4%

14% (5% Bike)

Bogotá 2018

35%

7%, 16% SITP

13%

8%

16% (9% Bike)

Source: Compiled data from MedellínComoVamos.org and BogotaComoVamos.org polling data
responding to “What is your principal mode of transport” in annual “Informe de Calidad de
Vida” and/or “Encuesta de Percepcion Ciudadana”
27

This includes “Bus/Ejecutivo, Buseta, Colectivo”
Selected 2006 because that is the first years studies are conducted.
29
Does not include bike data.
30
Includes Metroplus
31
Principal mode of transport to work.
32
Principal mode of transport to work.
28
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Literature to Date and Expansion of Research Question
Determining what the right mix of global and local governance is in regard to climate
change requires examining a number of fields of scholarship surrounding urban governance,
global governance, economic development, and climate change governance. To organize these
fields, I have identified key questions that will inform my analysis of how and why these global
and local interactions shape the sustainability of public transportation projects in Medellín and
Bogotá. The first questions revolve around what the key governance gaps are when it comes to
climate change and why global and local actors are best suited to fill these governance gaps.
After justifying why global and local actors should exercise authority over climate change issues
and defining their ideal governing roles, we must ask how these actors construct their authority
over climate change governance issues in a changing global system. Finally, we turn to what the
potential downsides are in empowering local and global actors. At this point, I would like to
note that this analysis structure does not do well in accounting for the national government's role
in climate change policy or as an intermediary between global and local actors. Because of this, I
did not spend time analyzing the national government policies. If this work were to continue to
move forward, the framework would need to articulate the national government’s role in order to
offer a complete justification for proposing an increase in global and local authority over climate
change issues

Who Should Govern Climate Change and Why?
New forms of global governance described in the introduction prompted scholars to more
fully define why global or local actors should have authority to govern climate change issues.
Climate change governance requires overcoming obstacles associated with incentivizing

12
collective action and controlling global public goods.33 Because environmental resources like
water and clean air are subject to the challenges of under provision and overuse, no single actor
has an interest in unilaterally preserving resources or preventing pollution. Bulkeley and CastanBroto frame these challenges as socio-technical meaning that they attempt to change material
arrangements and the cultural norms that determine a city’s emissions and vulnerabilities.34 For
instance, a study of the impact of transportation policy in Medellín asserted that achieving
meaningful emission reductions in transportation requires both incentivizing mass transport
(social) and developing capacity (technical).35
Scholars argue that global governance initiatives are the ideal level for governing climate
change issues because global actors can provide coordination, knowledge sharing, transparency,
and resources.36 In contrast, proponents for empowering local actors argue that municipal
governments should have more authority because of their institutional capacity to deliver public
services and manage infrastructure with better channels of communication.37 Local governments
are also favored due to their higher democratic legitimacy that facilitates the social aspects of
socio-technical transitions and generates potential for innovation based on the concentration of
resources, which are both physical and skill based.38 Table 3 provides a breakdown of the ways
that global and local actors would influence climate change governance and overcome the
governance gaps in an ideal situation.

33

Keohane “Beyond the tragedy of the commons.”
Vanesa Castán-Broto and Harriet Bulkeley, “A Survey of Urban Climate Change Experiments in 100 Cities.,”
Global Environmental Change 23 (2013): 92–102.
35
Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2016)
36
Klaus Weber and Sara B. Soderstrom, “Sustainability Discourse and Capitalist Variety: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis,” Corporate Social Responsibility in a Globalizing World, January 1, 2015, 218–48,
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316162354.007.
37
Harriet Bulkeley, Vanesa Castán Broto, and Gareth A.S. Edwards, An Urban Politics of Climate Change:
Experimentation and the Governing of Socio-Technical Transitions (London, UK: Routledge, 2015).
38
Ibid.
34
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Table 3: Addressing Governing Problems in Climate Change
Governance
Problem

Global/Local Strength in Addressing the Problem

Collective Action
Problem

Local
● Democratic legitimacy (social)
● Institutional capacity (technical)
Global
● Coordination with other levels of government (technical/social)
● Increasing transparency and accountability (technical/social)
● Providing financial incentives (technical/social)

Global Public Good

Local
● Institutional capacity (ability to communicate, plus local
knowledge)
Global
● Coordination
● Knowledge sharing and transparency for tracking
● Resource provision
Source: Eleanor Jackson

Collective action surrounding the maintenance of these environmental global public
goods proves difficult due to three major global governance gaps that Brüh and Rittberger
identify. They consider the jurisdictional gap, where public policy is assumed to be
predominantly national in focus and scope, the operational gap, where public institutions lack
the information and instruments to respond, and the incentive gap, in which global governors
struggle to convince local actors to comply with recommendations.39 Effective global and local
interactions will build on the strengths of each group to overcome these gaps.
To analyze whether the global and local actors effectively play to their strengths when
filling the governance gap, I will build on studies done by groups like the World Resource

39

Brüh, and Rittberger, “From international to global governance: Actors, collective decision-making, and the
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Institute (WRI), the UN, and various universities. As seen in Table 1, I will measure the sociotechnical outcomes using (1) decreased air pollution over time measured (2) decrease in
car/motorcycle use (3) the use of sustainable materials and fuels (electric buses, gas buses,
electric Metro) (4) increase in environmental messaging and activism, and (5) the connection to
bike and pedestrian routes.40 In general, statistics from the transport companies and international
groups find larger positive impacts and higher emissions reductions from innovations in urban
transportation than those from academic papers.
When analyzing the impacts, it is important to note that the majority of the data on
pollution, equality, and even competitiveness all come from global institutions. For instance, the
UN defines the sustainable development goals (SDGs) used as benchmarking tools. It also
influences how inequality is measured by legitimizing tools like Gini coefficients. Standard
measures of success produced by these global reports are in many ways useful. They are based in
rigorous research and help to increase collective action by creating concrete goals and provide
tools for measuring outcome. However, these methods have been backed into our implicit
understanding of success from a Western, capitalist perspective. In analyzing the success of the
systems, I will use many standard measures as they are still the most useful way to conceptualize
the very real problems created by climate change. However, I will also work to highlight their
potential bias and to draw out the more social aspects of the socio-technical changes required for
successful climate change action as they are often lost in the standard numerical measurements.
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How Do Global and Local Actors Over Climate Change Issues?
As stated earlier, global and local actors do not necessarily have a classic legal authority
to govern climate change issues. TCCG uses discourse analysis to categorize the dominant
strategies different initiating actors use to gain authority and legitimacy when carrying out
climate change governance projects. Their categories, while not directly applicable to my cases,
help construct a framework for understanding potential sources for global actors to gain
legitimacy within these systems.
TCCG finds that actors use ideological legitimation through a motivating world view to
show why climate change action should take place. Actors generally use either market liberal
ideology, based on utility of market for stimulating innovation, institutionalist ideology,
highlighting the role of institutions in providing protection, bio-environmentalist ideology,
recognizing the need to address the earth’s limited carrying capacity, and social green ideology,
attempting to address the social importance of the environment for well-being. Second, actors
have sources of legitimacy that they appeal to gain the authority to govern climate change issues.
Actors may select moral legitimacy, on the basis of what the actor stands for, delegation, where
actors give explicit consent, expertise, based on technical knowledge, democracy, from citizen
representation and participation, economic resources, based on the financial ability to act, or
jurisdiction, when an actor has existing authority over a policy area of geography. Finally, actors
must legitimate their actions by indicating why others should comply with the rules they provide.
Here initiating actors can appeal to efficiency, meaning that if others go along with their idea
they will be able to make more with less, urgency, change needs to be made immediately to
avoid catastrophe, learning, their plan allows for an exchange of knowledge, or justice, their plan
corrects a wrong. Most importantly, Bulkeley et al. found the main legitimating discourses were
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market liberal ideology, based on the utility of the market in stimulating innovation. Initiating
actors then convinced other actors to comply by emphasizing the pursuit of efficiency. Finally,
initiating actors grounded their authority in an appeal to expertise.41 These findings indicated a
relationship between neoliberalism and environmentalism. As the majority of the initiating actors
used in this study were global actors, these discourses represent the dominant global
discourses.42 Applying the TCCG discourses framework to the local level, this research will use
market liberal ideology, appeals to expertise, and green discourse as rhetorical flags that draw
attention to how the local actors appeal to global governance and take up these global governing
incentives.43
Based on the discourses presented in TCCG, I argue that global governance tends to
provide four general incentives for local governments to pursue climate change policy. The
prevalence of market liberal ideology and appeals to efficiency and expertise, relate to global
actor’s ability to provide immediate financial resources. Based on Bourdieu’s argument that
symbolic spatial strategies for can create growth where “symbolic capital” in the form of
(mis)recognition of prestige can be exchanged for economic capital, this market liberal and
efficiency ideology also appeals to urban pride. The use of appeals to learning correlates with
their ability to provide technical resources and knowledge sharing. Finally, just as the TCCG
framework highlighted how local actors appeal to jurisdiction, global actors can provide political
legitimacy to local governments by aligning them with strong institutions.
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Using Carmin et al.’s framework that uses endogenous and exogenous factors to explain
a city’s ability to act on climate change issues, I identified four key endogenous factors that
determine how Medellín and Bogotá act. Local governments’ ability to govern climate change
action depend on (1) their political and fiscal autonomy, (2) political power of the local
government and effectiveness of the municipal bureaucracy, (3) social cohesion of the city, and
(4) their technical knowledge. 44 Table 5 gives some potential indicators for each of these factors.
When barriers in these areas impede the local government’s ability to govern, that government
can attempt to overcome that barrier by calling upon the immense global networks. This option is
particularly appealing for cities in the global south in this day and age because global actors
(both public and private) have bought into the idea of “sustainable development,” if a local
government can signal that it is ready to be innovative, competitive, and sustainable, global
actors will readily help said government work around its policy barriers.
Additionally, in innovation and socio-technical transition studies, theories posit that a
trigger, usually a political crisis or shift in financial autonomy, is necessary to provoke change in
a system.45 While in urban climate change governance, this trigger should have to do with the
environment, neither TransMilenio nor the Metro come from a climate change trigger. I argue
that the nature of the initial local crisis helps shape how the system interacts with global
governance and eventually becomes more focused on climate change. Because neither urban
transportation project was initially triggered in response to climate change, but in response to
distinct urban issues, the insertion of sustainability issues and environmentalism into the systems
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can be seen as a result of the cities taking global actors up on their climate change incentives
based on the city’s local governing weaknesses. Figures 1 and 2 summarize the global and local
interactions set out in the last few sections.
Figure 1: Global Incentives Offered to Influence Local Projects

Pride and Status
(Symbolic Capital)

Immediate Financial
Gain

Technical
Knowledge/Resources

Legitimation of Local
Actors

Events, Prizes, City
Networks, Positive
Press,

Loans (Conditional
From World Bank),
Clean Development
Mechanism ( CDM),
Private Banks

Private Companies
Contract, Knowledge
Sharing Networks,
World Bank Studies

Loans to Provide
Financial Power,
Global Press, Social
Clout

Technology for
Metrocable, Electric
Bi-Articulated Buses,
GIS Spatial Planning

Ability to Overcome
Local Divides in
Government (Elite,
Symbolic), Ability to
Provide Services
(Constituent,
Democratic)

Tourism, FDI, New
Ability to Secure
Loans

Projects
(TransMilenio and
Metro de Medellín)

Source: Eleanor Jackson
Figure 2: Local Incentives to Seek Out Global Actors
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What Are Potential Costs and Benefits of Global Involvement in Local Climate Governance?
Merely matching local endogenous weaknesses with global incentives does not create
successful climate change governance. Sometimes taking up the incentives offered at the global
level can reduce successful mitigation of climate change by impeding the potential benefits of
empowering local actors. Chu et al. finds that the global incentives for climate change
governance and research on climate change downplay, and sometimes inhibit, the broader social
and cultural changes necessary for transforming entrenched and powerful political and economic
regimes that define urban development. To crystalize these ideas in the context of my cases and
the larger body of literature, I will look at three types of global governance risk technocratic,
political, and neoliberal.
The first risk of global governance will be called the technocratic risk of global
governance. This technocratic risk occurs when global governance increases the importance of
expertise and technocratic values to the point of damaging democracy. This risk has the potential
to negate the benefits of empowering local actors by decreasing civic engagement. In their work
TCCG, Bulkeley et al. not only find that the initiating actors in multilevel climate change
initiatives tend to appeal to “expertise,” often exhibited through technical knowledge in line with
global norms, but also that projects appealing to technocratic values rarely also appeal to
democratic values.46 These trends highlight that the democratic deficit emblematic of global
governance that presents a risk to climate change policy in that climate change action, generally,
requires a strong sense of community and civic engagement to overcome collective action
problems. In line with these findings, Bulkeley and Castan Broto’s study on the types of climate
change action—social or technical—undertaken in cities through found that most urban climate
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change experiments were technical and not social innovations.47 One explanation for the
prevalence of technical innovation over social innovation in cities could be that cities take on
global norms and values due to their place in the global capital market. While technical changes
are important, as noted in the introduction, social changes, such as increasing a sense of
community or changing consumption patterns, are just as important for overcoming the
collective action problems in governing on climate change. This need to increase social climate
change initiatives links directly with the initial rationale for including local actors as they were
the stakeholders with “a direct link to the public” according to the 1992 UN Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio. The disproportionate amount of technical innovations
indicates that cities may not be utilizing the local accountability and democratic legitimacy that
gives them a key advantage in climate change governance.
Along with the risk of becoming overly technocratic, cities can place too much political
legitimacy in global governance problems associated with global legitimation represents the
political risks of global governance. These political risks largely stem from the relationship
between technocracy and democracy noted above. However, they have an added dimension. If
the mayor utilized global support as a means for political legitimacy, this incurs the risk of the
community turning against said global institution and sending them back to square one. Overall,
global legitimation appears to work better when unifying the elites in a city than unifying the
entire city. The elites are well connected to global networks, who act as a gate between the local
groups and the global stage, and who stand to benefit the most from increased investment. These
factors mean that elites take global cues more seriously and, in the case of Bogotá, global
incentives can be enough to overcome infighting as they defer to its perceived authority.
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However, the elites, both public and private, must then translate the incentives to the entire city.
As the key focus of interaction between global and local levels of governance, elite groups in the
cities will be central to this analysis.
The third set of risks will be referred to as neoliberal risks of global governance, based
on Peter Brand’s work as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR) theories.48 Brand argues
that cities engaged in seeking global capital often promote a style of neoliberal urbanism where a
green city image helps obtain global capital while allowing elites and private actors to obscure
their role in causing climate change.49 They instead blame citizen’s individual actions, like using
plastic bags, and position themselves as the centers of progress by promoting innovation and
efficiency. Global and local private companies and politicians can then profit from the
appearance of doing good through implementing the “urbanism of spectacle,” which functions
like “greenwashing” by focusing on show over substance. Brand argues that Medellín’s cable
cars exemplify this urbanism of spectacle. These tactics not only shift focus away from the main
culprits of climate change, but they tend to empower elites and increase inequality which in turn
tears at the social fabric necessary for long term growth. Scholars like Brand find
environmentalism often acts as a rhetorical, discursive tool for global, local, and private actors to
carve out new spheres of authority.
Brand’s assessment of neoliberal risk as well his theoretical work linking neoliberal
interests with environmental governance, chart nicely onto the CSR literature promoting the
ability of private actors to self-govern on climate change issues within a normative environment
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conducive to sustainability.50 Hackworth’s theories on neoliberal cities then supports this linkage
by arguing that that cities are pushed to act like corporations in the neoliberal world.51 This
neoliberal global governance risk can then be linked to the critiques of CSR.
Table 4: A Definition of Key Global Governance Risks52
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As seen in Table 4, all three risks, the negative outcomes are associated with an increase
in elite power. These links indicate that elites both play a significant role in overcoming the
global governance gaps, but their role may negatively affect local governance to the point of
negating the potential benefits of local and global interactions.

Methodology
This work builds on both primary resources, namely interviews, and secondary resources,
a significant body of literature, to analyze the global and local climate change governance
outcomes. Given my time and resource constraints, I will use the office of the mayor, which I
will also refer to as and the transportation companies as the focus of this analysis. While I will be
looking at other actors, particularly global actors and community-based actors, I will use them to
understand how the local governments and the local transportation companies manage their
projects. I will use the term “actor” to refer to a diverse range of global and local entities that
take up different governing responsibilities.
To analyze responses to the systems, I used both newspaper articles and interviews to
gauge the local and global. I draw on extensive polling done by Com Vamos in both Bogotá and
Medellín. While these polls are incredibly valuable, the questions they ask vary between the
cities and from year to year. This inconsistency means that some useful comparisons could not
be made. During January of 2019, I traveled to Bogotá and Medellín where I conducted
interviews with a number of key actors in each city, observed the physical environment, and use
the public transport systems. The interviews were semi-structured. A full list of the interviewees
and my connection to each of them can be found in the appendix. I highlight my connections to
these people to establish the potential bias in my interviews. Not only am I a white, upper-class,
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American university student, but I was connected to most of these people through individuals
with significant political power and global connections. This position likely influenced the way
interviewees both appealed to global standards and their willingness to critique their city,
especially in the case of Medellín.
To understand the constructions of authority I examined language in both World Bank
documents and local planning documents. The environmental outcomes of the system and the
levels of “globalness” in each city were the most difficult to measure. Understanding the
restrictions of the measurements, I will analyze the degree of “globalness” in each city in
accordance with neoliberal conceptions of competitiveness codified in global rankings and works
by scholars like Greg Clark. To attempt to measure the environmental outcomes of each of these
systems, I gathered data from World Bank, World Resource Institute (WRI), studies done by
universities, statistics put out by the transport companies, and various newspaper reports.
I would like to note that by framing cities as responders to global incentives, this research
implicitly gives global governments more authority over climate change issues than local
governments and assumes a top down policy making process (at least linguistically). However,
through this work, I hope to highlight how climate change policy making is highly multilevel and
cities being able to respond or not respond to global incentives actually means they have
significant power over their own policy making, additionally, the cases of the Metro de Medellín
as well as the ciclorutas in Bogotá will show that an lower level of global governance can have
positive impacts on the social outcomes and local sense of ownership, which in turn helps
increase sustainability.
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Hypothesis and Outline of Arguments
To explain these different outcomes of the systems, the chapters will analyze Bogotá in
the late 1990s when TransMilenio forms, Medellín in the late 2000s during its miraculous turn
around, and Bogotá in 2016 when Peñalosa returns as mayor and transforms the city again.
Across these cases I will analyze the weaknesses in the endogenous environment, the incentives
offered by the type global governance available at the time, the effect of said governance on the
social-technical climate change components of the public transportation systems, the presence of
the three global governance risks, and finally, the presence of buffers that may have reduced the
impact of the global governance risk. Within each chapter, the sections will analyze each of these
five aspects of global-local dynamics. The framework of global governance risks allows us to
conceptualize some specific problems (aka risks) that local politicians run into when attempting
to navigate local, global, and even national actors. It also helps to emphasize the power
imbalances inherent in the capitalist global systems and the importance of climate change as a
mechanism for constructing authority. As this analysis requires a number of moving pieces, I
will lay out my key hypotheses as a way to guide your reading.
Starting with the global level, the state of the international system will shape the global
incentives offered to the cities. The endogenous environment and the needs of the city will then
determine the type of global governance incentive that the local government will respond to. In
the late 1990s and early 2000s Bogotá engaged with multilateral global governance because it
was a capital city, it needed to fix an inefficient private transportation, its political environment
made policy making difficult, and it lacked financial resources. These endogenous factors cause
Bogotá’s local officials to seek political legitimacy, short term finance, and technical knowledge
from global actors (namely the World Bank and the IDB). Medellín did not engage with global
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actors when Bogotá did because it was not a capital city or economic powerhouse at the time,
and it had to deal with its internal crisis and needed to solve a social problem. In the late 2000s,
Medellín engaged with the network of public, private, and non-governmental global actors
because it needed long term investment to maintain its social urbanism policies and short-term
investment in the projects. These needs led the Medellín authorities to seek global recognition,
“symbolic capital,” from a variety of global actors by branding itself and its transportation
projects.
The type of global actor the city appeals to will help determine the type of risk. In
general, a stronger multilateral system tends to result in technocratic and political global
governance risks and a more multilevel system increases the neoliberal global governance risks,
Figure 1 shows this progression. During the construction of the systems, Bogotá experienced
multilateral global governance in the form of World Bank and IDB loans, while Medellín
experienced multilevel governance in the form of international loans, events, and private
companies, such as Siemens, working on projects. As the multilateral organizations felt their
center of power shifting around the 1990s, they began actively looking to increase municipal
authority by promoting decentralization as part of the Washington Consensus and interacted with
Bogotá as more of a partner. This partnership increased the initial success of the system,
especially in regard to its technical success and innovation. However, the expansion of
TransMilenio was hindered by the technocratic risks which decreased local engagement with and
support for the system. TransMilenio also exhibited the political risks that tied the system too
closely to Peñalosa and global groups after both the World Bank and Peñalosa used the projects
to legitimize their authority. While the neoliberal risk is not as prevalent in this stage, the
problematic power of the private buses within TransMilenio reveals that regardless of the type of
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global interaction, the power of private companies tends to increase with increased global
governance. Private groups have presented some of the largest impediments to sustainable
transport in all three cases.
When looking at the cases of Medellín and Bogotá today, changes in the global
governance system in the late 2000s reshaped the way cities interacted with global actors. The
new multilevel system centered less on the traditional multilateral organization and more on a
network of public, private, and non-governmental actors. This new global market created more
competition for cities like Medellín and required that they sell themselves to global capital. This
global-local interaction exhibits neoliberal risks of global governance. Peñalosa’s second term as
mayor of Bogotá in 2016 exhibits both neoliberal and political risks of global governance;
however, his move to mimic Medellín’s transportation programs indicates the Metro succeeded
in avoiding some of the risks Bogotá incurred. Figure 3 summarizes these relationships.
Figure 3: Overview of Global Governance Risk Process
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In both cities and for each type of global governance risk, stronger local culture and sense of
civic duty mitigates the governance risk. While the initial Metro project was a disaster in terms
of technical planning and transparency, Medellín avoided the worst consequences of the global
risks because the city had to create a strong local community with social cohesion (in part to
overcome the cartel violence) before increasing engagement with multilevel global governance.
The social support surrounding the Metro helped to mitigate some of the neoliberal risks of
global governance despite Brand’s skepticism.
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Chapter Two
Bogotá and Multilateral Institutions: Technocratic and Political Risks
Introduction
This chapter will explain TransMilenios strong start and subsequent decline by
articulating how the technocratic and political risks of global governance impacted the system.
Starting with the initial local crisis where the economic inefficiencies of the private bus system
pushed the local government to prioritize new public transport, the first section will explain how
the endogenous environment led local actors to interact with global actors. After characterizing
the endogenous environment, the next section will look at the global system and explain the key
interactions between global actors and the local government. During the creation of
TransMilenio, the multilateral model of global governance remained dominant and exerted
significant influence over Bogotá in the 1990s through both national and local loans as well as
development programs. The multilateral model of global governance favored giving incentives
for climate change actions based on immediate financial resources in the form of conditional
loans, technical resources, and the provision of authority.53 The last sections will articulate how
the successes and failures of TransMilenio can be explained by the technocratic and political
global governance risks.
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They also operate through the soft law and normative aspects of global governance; however, the loans and
programs represent the focus of their work and differentiate them from the multilevel governance systems. That
being said, the multilevel system is also emerging at this time, and the implications of that will be drawn out a bit in
this chapter.
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Endogenous Environment
The Public Transportation Crisis in Bogotá
As Carmin et al. argues, the endogenous environment in the city determines how well the
local government can implement climate change policy and whether or not they will uptake
global incentives for climate change governance.54 The first aspect of the endogenous
environment is the type of crisis that led the city closer to global actors. The crisis that triggered
TransMilenio was not environmental but stemmed from a faulty private system. Transportation
overhaul was on the mind of mayors in Bogotá almost as long as those in Medellín; in fact, they
tried and failed to obtain funding for a metro within a few months of Medellín.55 Prior to
TransMilenio, the bus system in Bogotá was a private conglomerate that citizens and authorities
considered corrupt, environmentally unfriendly, unsafe, unpredictable, and oversupplied. High
levels of competition between operators for passengers led to inefficiencies of scheduling and
dangerous driving that resulted in la guerra del centavo (the penny war) and prompted officials
to look for an alternative system.56 The economic inefficiencies of the private bus system
created the crisis that pushed the local government to invest in new public transportation. The
nature of this crisis as a service provision, transport centric problem both shaped the initial goals
of the project and made Bogotá more likely to turn to global governments that positioned
themselves as economic authorities capable of tackling technical issues.
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Fiscal and Political Autonomy
Bogotá’s local autonomy was very low until 1991 when the decentralization policies
promoted by international groups increased Bogotá’s local budget as well as the municipality’s
ability to control its allocation. Dietz and Myers claim that the change in financial policy caused
an increase in Bogotá’s tax revenues. They calculate that the city’s tax revenue increased by 77
percent from 1993 to 1994. This increase in tax revenue was particularly important in contrast to
1991 when 23 percent of Bogotá’s revenue came from borrowing. 57 The prevalence of
borrowing was particularly problematic as city officials in Bogotá complained that Congress paid
little attention to the capital city.58 The relative historic weakness of Bogotá’s local government
may have contributed to the relative strength of private groups, namely the private bus
companies, when it came to public-private partnerships. That being said, between 1991 and
1996, capital expenditure increased steadily from around 500 billion pesos annually to 2,000
billion pesos annually. This increase in expenditures indicates that decentralization policies did
give the government a renewed ability to implement policy independently of the national
government. This change had a more significant impact on Bogotá than Medellín, which relied
on revenues from its state companies that will be discussed in the next chapter.59
Despite increasing municipal fiscal autonomy, financing a metro project, as was Bogotá’s
initial goal, remained difficult due to the 1989 Metro Law.60 In 1982, the national government
agreed to finance Medllín’s metro in large part due to President Betancur, a process which will
be addressed in the Medellín chapter. However, the national government’s decision to finance
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Medellín’s metro meant Bogotá would not receive financing and Betancur told them “we will
leave this for the next government.”61 After the Metro project went into debt, the national
government passed the 1989 Metro Law.62 The law allowed local governments to increased taxes
by 20% to cover the costs of infrastructure development, but it also stated that the local
government must cover 70% of the costs and that the national government would cover 30%.63
Bogotá was constrained by Medellín’s mistakes.
Bogotá’s low municipal coordination also proved problematic. Low coordination
between different municipal branches led to as the lack of consistency between the Territorial
Order Plan, Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial (POT) and Zonal plans.64 The four year lag for
obtaining approval of land consolidation or construction permits make it hard to implement long
term spatial visions and inhibit the private sector to respond to the economic changes brought by
the TransMilenio corridors.65 The continued lack of horizontal coordination that hinders planning
in the city even today reveals how global governance can address short term, technical issues
well but struggles with long term, systemic changes.

Democratic Legitimacy and Local Participation
In both Bogotá and Medellín, local governments have suffered from what Carlos Cadena,
Academic Coordinator for Urban and Environmental Studies (URBAM) at EAFIT, Director of
the World Bike Forum, and co-founder of La Ciudad Verde, called the “Adam and Eve
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complex.” 66 This Adam and Eve complex is a quintessential Colombian problem where each
mayor or president undoes the work done by the mayor before them and starts fresh to prove
their policies are better. The national law that prevents mayors from serving consecutive terms
exacerbates this Adam and Eve complex. On top of the Adam and Eve complex, in Bogotá, the
lack of political consensus was cited as a major issue for the systems more frequently than in
Medellín. For instance, Andres Ortíz, head of the Secretary of Planning, argued that Medellín’s
mayors win by 40% and govern with 80% approval, in Bogotá they win with 35% and govern
with 20%.67 Between Antanas Mockus (2001-2004), Lucho Garzón (2004-2007), and Samuel
Moreno (2008-2010), the only mayor to increase in favorability over their term was Mockus
(from 42% to 58 %).68 Overall the tumultuous nature of politics in Bogotá, as well as the
emphasis on transportation in politics, hurt Bogotá’s ability to make long term policy and create
cohesive municipal transport plan.
The weak social cohesion and the polarized political environment also created a near
constant need for local officials to find sources of political legitimacy. In part due to its nature as
a capital city and the largest city in the country, Bogotá has a more diverse ethnic and geographic
makeup. In my interview with Zoraida Rueda, Advisor to the City Council of Bogotá, she
described how the majority of people living in Bogotá did not identify as city natives.69 She and
many others expressed envy for Medellín’s cohesive paisa culture and credited Medellín’s
success to this social cohesion. While they often referenced this discrepancy as an unfortunate
fact of life, the city has actively worked to change this reality. As the city gained more
autonomy, mayors realized that the lack of community engagement and social cohesion would be
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a key issue. On the initial 1996 World Bank Municipal Development Program report, they
reference this lack of community:
“One of the basic themes of the present Mayor is that the low sense of civic pride and
community responsibility in the District contributes to the current chaotic and poor
condition of the system. To address this concern, he has initiated several programs
involving citizen participation, public education and awareness campaigns and he has
also appointed technical experts to review urban transport sector operations, including
institutional changes which are aimed at strengthening the strategic planning capability of
the District.”70
This funding resulted in Mayor Antanas Mockus’s cultura ciudadana (citizen culture)
programs. Cultura ciudadana refers to the norms and values that govern the citizens. These
programs did not solve the problem, and the lack of social cohesion contributed to a lack of
political strength and an inability to govern, especially as the social makeup of the city became
even more diverse during the more intense periods of violence in Colombia as people from rural
areas flocked to the safety of the city in search of a better life.

Bogotá’s Responses to Global Governance Incentives: Co-Creation of TransMilenio
The Multilateral Governance System and Bogotá
In part because Bogotá was the capital city, it was pulled into transnational city networks,
like the C40, soon after they emerged. This earlier entry meant that Bogotá became more
globalized and is still more fully incorporated into global networks than Medellín even today. On
these networks’ websites, Bogotá has fairly full pages of information and is included in more
studies than Medellín. Similarly, Bogotá is measured in significantly more global city indexes
like the AT Kearney global index measuring 135 “global cities.”
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As mentioned in the previous section, in 1991, the World Bank implemented the
“Municipal Development Program” that aimed to improve local government institutions in
support of this move towards decentralization.71 This program complemented the Constitution of
1991, which marked the full adoption of decentralization in Colombia and gave local
governments new powers to democratically elect mayors, collect taxes. and allocate funds.72 The
development program and the constitution as well as the connection between them, emphasized
the rise of “good urban governance” in Colombia and particularly in Bogotá. Bogotá exemplified
the second wave of global cities, “emerging global cities,” defined as a large capital city whose
economic performance is closely indexed with global demand.73
This decentralization process gave Bogotá even more local autonomy than other cities in
Colombia. According to a 1996 World Bank report:
“the Government issued a decree in July 1993, which provisions of the Constitution made
equivalent to a law - Decree 1421, Statute of Bogotá - through which the District enjoys a
special status in administrative, organizational, and fiscal terms… Currently, it receives
revenues which in the rest of Colombia only accrue to the departmental governments (i.e.
states) and its central administration is subdivided in secretariats and departments which
operate with funds handled by the District Treasury (Secretaria de Hacienda).”
This status and increased local autonomy increased the city’s ability to implement “good
urban governance.” Becoming a bigger player in the global system at this time meant that, while
both Bogotá and Medellín interacted with multinational private companies, international media,
and international NGOs, Bogotá was more integrated into the multilateral institutions. For
instance, when searching the World Bank document database, the term “Bogota” searched within
“Colombia” yields 511 documents and the term “Medellín” yields only 56 disclosed
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documents.74 While the larger number of documents can in part be attributed to the World
Bank’s role in funding TransMilenio and implementing the National Urban Transport Program
(NUTP) based on the TransMilenio model, these documents indicate a far closer relationship
between Bogotá and the World Bank than between Medellín and the World Bank.

The Creation of TransMilenio
TransMilenio was financed by a fuel tax (46%), local revenues (28%), a credit from the
World Bank (6%) and grants from the national government (20%). Half of the 25% gasoline tax
levied in Bogotá is used for the continued expansion of TransMilenio.”75 Despite only 6% of the
public financing for TransMilenio coming from the World Bank (because Bogotá struggled to
obtain financing for the project until the World Bank intervened) first to increase municipal
autonomy through the municipal development programs, then to provide this support for
TransMilenio, the World Bank’s involvement outstrips the 6% credit.
The system itself was described as an innovative model featuring public private
partnerships. Operations are contracted through concession contracts with private operators from
local transportation companies associated with national and international investors.76 According
to Ardila Gómez, the TransMilenio model breaks the traditional public transport system and
creates a “bimodal” transit structure that is a “competition for the market” meaning that operators
have competitive bids, the contracts expire, but there are barriers to entry to prevent the
overcrowding. It is bimodal in that conventional modes of transport compete through price while
74
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the TransMilenio mode competes through quality. 77 Table 5 lays out the basic duties of the
private and public aspects of TransMilenio.
Table 5: Division of PPP Powers in TransMilenio
PPP Structure

Powers

TransMilenio

●
●
●
●
●

Plan and supervise service
Collect fares through a third party
Pay operators per km logged (not per passenger)
Fare covers system costs
Concessions end when fleet logs 850,000 km on average
per bus

Private Concessionaires

● Have the right to incentives
● Offer good service bc they get 80% of TransSantiago
contracts assigned them demand risk
● Profit highly
Source: Ardila Gómez, 200478

Because of the World Bank’s direct influence through loans as well as technical support
through planning and monitoring, the process of creating TransMilenio was in many ways a cocreation between the local government and the global government. Unlike the consortium of
Spanish-German banks that provided the loan for the Metro de Medellín with the backing of the
national government, the World Bank and the mayor were the key participants in the
development of TransMilenio. While the national Ministry of Transportation was involved in the
discussions; however, the mayor was more influential. In my interview with Angelica Castro, exCEO of TransMilenio and ex-advisor to the National Ministry of Transportation, she noted that
the mayor of Bogotá had more sway than the Minister of Transport during the discussions about
TransMilenio.79 This difference in influence can be attributed to the World Bank’s mission as
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well as its need to actively promote its own authority in the shifting global governance system.
The scope and nature of its work generates a greater need for legitimacy than that of the privatenational banks or individual corporations.
The type of work the World Bank does in increasing transparency and promoting
accountability played a role in the World Bank publicizing and studying TransMilenio to the
extent it did. As we will see in the risks sections, creating a narrative featuring a World Bank
project legitimizes the system by showing that it adheres to the global norms; paradoxically, this
same narrative eventually damages the system within Bogotá as it reduces a sense of local
ownership and local responsibility for the system.

Technocratic and Political Global Governance Risks Impact on Sustainability
The Benefits of Multilateral Global Governance
Before discussing the failures, it is important to note there were benefits to the World
Bank’s involvement as well. Despite these social failures that will be discussed, the World
Bank’s involvement in Bogotá’s transportation system did produce an initially strong system that
increased sustainability and solved the transport problem from a technical standpoint. The World
Bank’s involvement in the system successfully increased transparency, promoted knowledge
sharing with other cities in and out of Colombia, and provided financial incentives for programs
to reduce emissions, which all contributed to the sustainability of the system. According to a
2013 World Bank report, riding Bogotá’s TransMilenio results in average time savings of 32
percent (20 minutes) per trip compared to the traditional bus system. This represents a savings of
more than 10 hours per month for the average rider. TransMilenio has also been able to abate 1.9
million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent between 2001 and 2010. The system has scrapped
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more than 2,100 old buses since its inception; decreased accident rates by 90 percent in the
corridors where the system operates; and reduced noise levels by 3-10 decibels.80
Unlike the Metro de Medellín, where poor planning and strong local political power
resulted in a corrupt financing process and initial fiscal ruin, TransMilenio exhibited a higher
level of planning and transparency. Even today, looking at the budgets online, TransMilenio
provides a more detailed account of its finances than the Metro de Medellín. While some, like
Fernando Rojas, expert on TransMilenio, indicate the spending on planning may have been
excessive, detailed planning helped avoid the crisis of Medellín.81 This transparency helped
increase confidence in the city as well as improve TransMilenio. In 2008, Bogotá became the
first city in Latin America to sign a direct loan with the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
without guarantee from the central government or any other group.82 This loan signified
Bogotá’s success creating global investor confidence in the city. This increased confidence
shows how Bogotá and TransMilenio hit all the right notes for good urban governance; however,
even measurable global success does not necessarily translate to local support. Come 2006, just
as the project was experiencing the some of the largest local protests yet, TransMilenio became
the first massive transport project in the world approved and registered under the Kyoto Protocol
to partake in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project.83 Between 2006 and 2007,
Bogotá received 2.637 billion pesos (1.3 million USD) for carbon reductions.84 An El Tiempo
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article boasted that Bogotá landed the front page of the New York Times with this news.85 This
decision further emphasized the importance of global attention and the tension between global
and local interests.
Despite initial environmental successes, Figure 2 shows that from 2007 to 2012 Bogotá
reduced the concentration of particles from 71.6 to 50, but from 2012 to 2016 the number barely
changed. I argue that this flatline in progress came in part from the global governance risks
addressed in the next sections and not simply from maxing out the technical capacity for change.
Figure 4: Concentration of Material Particles in Bogotá from 2007-2016

Source: Informe de Calidad de Vida, 2017, BogotáComoVamos.org

The Technocratic Global Governance Risk
Even with the technical successes, TransMilenio still the negative effects of the
technocratic global governance risk in the form of low local support and poor communication
that led to an eventual backlash. Multilateral intuitions, like the World Bank, have promoted
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technocracy and statistics as a measure of good governance, so the Bank’s involvement in the
project increased the value placed on technocracy. As the Medellín case will also demonstrate,
global engagement tends to increase the city’s attention to planning and statistics as a means of
complying with the emphasis on accountability. These practices not only drew on global
resources, but also followed global norms in prioritizing technocratic planning. Given the inverse
relationship between appeals to technocracy and democracy that ___ found, the links between
global and technocratic values highlights the importance of asking who is accountable to whom
in the global system.
In this case the technocratic risk shows how Bogotá became more accountable to the
global than the local at the cost of the long-term sustainability of TransMilenio. Hunt looked at
the citizen participation and the contestation over TransMilenio. Her work found that technocrats
depoliticized policy decisions and demobilized civil society by opting for formulas and
disregarding the knowledge of citizens, who drew on relational measurements and experiential
information. In general, citizens felt excluded from the planning process and disagreed with
technocratic opinions on time, usability, cost, overcrowding, and security.86 Zoraida Rueda
echoed this sentiment in our interview and explained that the city often practiced surface level
participation. Colombia has a strong legal framework for requiring citizen participation in the
planning of almost any project. However, all an official must do to prove citizen participation is
collect a certain number of signatories saying, “yes I attended this meeting.”87
This failure in the official public consultation process stands in stark contrast to Medellín
where strong planning coalitions between local actors and participatory budgeting processes
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contribute to local ownership over the system. In Bogotá, the robust political debates taking
place in the media, through protests, and through the street art, more readily reflect global norms
when it comes to what constitutes public participation. However, while the public outcries over
the system look like local engagement, they stem from local dissatisfaction and the sense that
citizens do not have a voice in the program. The lack of local investment in the early stages of
the program exacerbated by the technocratic risk meant that when the system ran into problems
and progress stalled between 2006 and 2014, the public was quick to turn against the project,
which in turn increased its problems.

The Political Global Governance Risk
Rhetorical Ownership and Legitimacy
While the rise of CSR initiatives and advertising in the 2010s resulted in an increased the
number of private companies and subnational actors involved in “development” projects, the
international institutions have traditionally been the ones to both do and promote development
work. Because their authority in this work rests on a moral obligation to increase peace and
prosperity, international institutions have incentives to promote their work and take ownership
over projects as a way to legitimize their authority. In the case of TransMilenio, the World Bank
positions itself as the origin of urban transportation projects in Colombia. This initial
implementation of TransMilenio was acclaimed by multilateral actors through favorable case
studies, reports, and articles on Bogotá’s innovative solution to urban mobility—global
recognition that may have undermined local control. In the 1996 “Bogotá Urban Transport
Project” report the Bank details its involvement in Colombia as though its projects are the
driving force behind development
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“The Public Sector Expenditure Review of 1987 first defined a framework for possible
urban transport operations in Bogotá and other Colombian cities. Subsequently, the 1993
Country Strategy Paper identified the need to address large-city congestion and included
the Project in the FY93-FY96 lending program. The proposed project was initially
entered into the Bank's lending program in June 1989, and first appraised in June 1990. A
post-appraisal mission was carried out in December 1990 after the District restructured
the role of some sector agencies, and negotiations were held in July 1991. After
negotiations, the District's failure to implement the proposed betterment levies and its
deteriorating financial performance led the Bank and the national government to
postpone processing the project… It was only in February 1995 that the loan processing
resumed after the newly-elected Mayor of Bogotá requested this and a re-appraisal
mission found that the above issues had been satisfactorily resolved.”88
In briefs and blogs on the World Bank website, they call TransMilenio as a “Bank-financed
program” and highlight the 1996 National Urban Transport Program (NUTP), which now focus
on BRT investments in Colombia’s largest cities, as the inspiration for TransMilenio despite the
fact that the BRT aspect of the system only came to fruition in 1998.89
The importance of perceived local ownership and a higher actual municipal ownership
over transport programs can be seen through the success of Bogotá’s bike system. The highly
successful CicloRutas and the extensive bike networks in Bogotá provide a great point of
comparison for TransMilenio and for Medellín. While the World Bank often references the bike
systems success, the creation of these programs predated the 1996 transportation programs. The
1996 World Bank report also highlighted the bike system and encouraged a continuation of it;
however, the report credited the bike system to the government saying that “the Government is
promoting the use of bicycles” meanwhile, they claim credit for TransMilenio in the previous
paragraph saying “the project promoted TransMilenio.”90 The local love for bikes was one of the
most surprising aspects of my interviews in Bogotá. During my interview with Ingrid Joanna
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Portilla Galindo, Director of Transport and Infrastructure for the Secretary of Mobility, she
described the different teams in the transport department and the size of the biking group in
comparison to the rest was staggering.91 Walking out of the interview, my brother, who
accompanied me to most of my interviews in Bogotá, laughed “they really seem to love bikes
here. Like every interview we’ve gone to, you start asking about the buses and they just go that’s
great, but, like, let’s talk about bikes.” From a quantitative standpoint, citizen satisfaction with
bikes ranked the highest of any mode of transport in 2010 and remained the highest with
upwards of 85% of the vote until 2018, when walking edged out bikes for frontrunner.92 The
influence of rhetorical ownership over local sense of ownership over the system can be seen
through news articles on the biking programs as well. Articles generally give credit for the bike
programs either to Mockus (who is associated more with local pride) or to “Bogotá,” while the
articles on TransMilenio almost always mention Peñalosa by name.

Personalization and Politicization
The increase in World Bank engagement in Bogotá took place largely under two mayors,
Antanas Mockus (1995-1998) and Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2001). While both were heavily
involved in overhauling public transportation and in dealing with the World Bank, Mockus and
Peñalosa have very different identities especially when it comes to highlighting their global
networks. Exploring their relationship to TransMilenio, with a focus on Peñalosa’s legacy,
reveals how appealing too much to the authority of global institutions can undermine the
transport system by helping to tie the system to the identity of an individual, in this case
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Peñalosa. This personalization then leads to politicization by feeding into the Adam and Eve
complex discussed earlier. While tying the TransMilenio to the World Bank played a major role
in getting the project off the ground and garnered Peñalosa praise both inside and outside the
city, this linkage put local support in a precarious position as well given that locals did not
always view global institutions favorably as mayors are less equipped to shape public perception
of global actors than public perception of local government.
Peñalosa did recognize the importance of local approval, particularly from the City
Council. His second objective in forming TransMilenio was to get the City Council’s approval
given that he did not think the existing city agencies lacked the capacity to deal with
TransMilenio and approval from the City Council “would be a huge political boost.”93 Despite
this understanding, as a mayor Peñalosa leaned towards global legitimation.
The international institutions provided both symbolic and actual sources of local
legitimation. Among the governing elite, Mockus and Peñalosa initially received symbolic
legitimacy through the global institution’s authority that helped their proposal pass political
deadlock. This symbolic legitimacy could then translate to local legitimacy as the World Bank
supplied loans and technical assistance that provided the type of concrete outcome that voters
care about. After creating TransMilenio, starting the Pico y Placa, a program which restricted
certain license plates on certain days, and improving parks, Peñalosa ended his first term with
some of the highest approval ratings despite low approval in the middle of his term.94 Despite
actually generating local approval, this type of political legitimacy created a few problems. First,
many of the structural and social issues that resulted in Bogotá’s political and social divisions
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were not fixed; they were merely bandaged by the World Bank’s money and reputation. Second,
because the system became more personalized and politicized through its ties to these mayors,
following through on Peñalosa’s initial plan, let alone making other improvements, proved
extremely difficult due to the heated political debates surrounding the existence of the system in
the first place. Third, being further politicized through its ties with global actors, TransMilenio
risked losing its legitimacy if local public opinion turned against the global institutions, a
problem which Mockus dealt with better than Peñalosa.
Appealing to global authority both elevated the power and prestige of the mayor as well
as the ties between mayor and transport system. In both cities, the mayors are extremely
powerful national figures. In general, the prestige of the mayor appears much stronger in Bogotá
than in Medellín, and this power creates a spotlight around them that fed into the Adam and Eve
complex, the tendency for each mayor to want to start from scratch. The political importance of
TransMilenio and its ties to Peñalosa, appears to increase the Adam and Eve complex
surrounding TransMilenio. While Mockus (2001-2003) and Luis Eduardo Garzón (2004-2006)
did not abandon the objectives of the project despite not focusing on it as heavily, in 2007
Samuel Moreno won his office by running on a well-received subway platform that built on the
rising backlash against the system.95 This win is made more significant in light of the global
success TransMilenio experienced in 2006 as one of the first projects to use the CDM mentioned
earlier in this chapter.
In our conversation, Angelica Castro said that she believed one of the key weaknesses of
TransMilenio is that the system’s image is heavily tied to Peñalosa, and thus, to politics. 96
Peñalosa’s aggressive promotion of TransMilenio and the BRT system after his time as mayor
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certainly exemplifies this view. Interviewees and articles alike link Peñalosa with TransMilenio,
calling him “the father of TransMilenio.” In a search of the Proquest Global News Stream,
“TransMilenio n/10 Peñalosa” produced 224 results with largely positive news articles. The
mayor with the next highest number of hits was Gustavo Petro with 204; however, the majority
of the articles were about his responses to protests against the system due to his 2007 campaign
against TransMilenio.97 During the campaign, Angelica Castro attempted to distribute pamphlets
to communicate TransMilenio’s Phase 3 to the citizens; however, because of the highly political
nature of the system, she was accused of using the system to back a particular political
candidate.98 This campaign made it difficult for TransMilenio to help citizens feel part of the
system and to create the social investment necessary for long term sustainability. In my interview
with Fernando Rojas, he highlighted the how the system’s failure to successfully implement the
stages of planning correlated with political divisions.99
In comparison with Peñalosa, Mockus managed to appeal to both global and local groups
and strike a balance within the political global governance risk. As a mayor, Peñalosa epitomizes
the pros and cons of appealing to global governance as a means of legitimizing a project. Not
only is Peñalosa tied to the World Bank through the creation of TransMilenio, but he was born in
Washington D.C. and attended Duke University.100 Mockus, one of the most popular mayors in
Bogotá, and the only one to increase in favor during his term, also exhibited appeals to
international norms, especially technocracy.101 However, Mockus worked hard to promote his
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local identity. When talking about their support for Mockus, people like Fernando Rojas
referenced his appeal as a professorial figure. This professorial appearance also adheres to
technocratic planning norms and reveals there is local support for both technocratic discourse
and methods. However, the case of Mockus differs from that of Peñalosa in that Mockus actively
promoted his local loyalty. Despite having Lithuanian parents and the right to an EU passport,
Mockus carries only a Colombian passport, emphasizing the importance of being perceived as a
loyal Colombian.102 His emphasis on his local identity highlights the political risk in associating
too strongly with lobal institutions.

Evidence of the Low of Local Engagement and Democratic Legitimacy
Fernando Rojas also claimed that one of the main problems with the project was that
citizens did not have a sense of ownership. As seen above, this lack of ownership came in part
from the technocratic and political risks of global governance. The creation of cultura
ciudadana, had been one of the main concerns in Bogotá due to its history of social fracture.
While the diverse population in Bogotá may help to make it a more global city, the lack of city
pride or cohesive identity serve as a major impediment for implementing successful climate
change governance. Figure 5 shows that from 2004 to 2008, citizen perceptions that others
“complied with the norms of responsible citizenship” were equally low in all regions. While this
number improved significantly in 2009, the trend still indicates a low trust in other citizens
across all socio-economic and geographic divides.
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Figure 5: Perception of Compliance with The Norms of Civic Responsibilities

Source: BogotáComoVamos, “Encuesta de Perception Ciudadana, 2010.
In addition to the low overall perception of civic responsibility, the sense of responsibility
to care for TransMilenio itself decreased significantly as the system encountered problems.
Between 2004 and 2010, the sense that citizens had a responsibility to care for TransMilenio
decreased from 3.7 out of 5 to 2.5 out of 5 with the largest decrease between 2008 and 2010.103
The sense of responsibility for every other category including abiding by the pico y placa
regulations remained roughly the same over the years. Because these other categories held
steady while TransMilenio floundered, the lack of progress made largely due to a lack of local
political support may have hurt the system.
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As for the other political risk based in the potential for local actors to turn against the
global actors themselves, Zoraida Rueda talked about the World Bank and the IDB seeing
Bogotá as the “ideal city to in-debt” both because of its high taxes and because they always pay
back their loans.104 While in theory this would be the goal for global cities—prove bankability
and secure financing—her intonation indicated that she, among others, believe the money from
the bank hurt more than it help. This negative perception of multilateral institutions represents
another risk of using global governance as shortcuts for political legitimation. As we will see in
Chapter 4, this low opinion of global actors has been made significantly worse due to recent
scandals involving diesel buses and unfair auctions under Peñalosa.
Additionally, global actors will not unconditionally support a system. While the
conditional nature of multilateral international engagement did help decrease corruption and
increase transparency, it also depending on global favor problematic. Despite initially positive
reviews, TransMilenio fell out of local, then international, favor. This decline in favor occurred
in part because successive mayors did not continue to build on the system due to political and
logistical problems. As the system failed to develop according to plan, it also failed to generate
local support and engagement. Without a strong base of trust among citizens, a series of crises
and bad press took a toll on the system. The key controversies included sexual assault, air
pollution from the diesel buses, accidents, and old fleets.105 Major protests in 2006 and 2012 hurt
the system further. Instead of promoting TransMilenio at the local level, Peñalosa toured the
world and worked with Volvo to promote BRT systems in other countries. His 2013 Ted Talk on
how buses represent “democracy in action” proves highly ironic and highly globalized.106
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The Neoliberal Global Governance Risk in Bogotá: Private Bus Companies
While the neoliberal risk is prevalent in Medellín under the multilevel governance
system, neoliberalism and the beginnings of multilevel networks existed in the 1990s and also
influenced Bogotá beginning with the 1991 Municipal Development Program. Dietz and Myers
argue that decentralization promoted by the World Bank allowed for the popular election of
mayors created a tendency for mayors to champion the priorities of the “city-oriented groups”
(taxi drivers, bus companies, car drivers, night club owners).107 This phenomenon aligns with
Chu et al.’s sense that while multilevel governance entails more democratic power,
accountability, and transparency, it can also lead to the consolidation of decision making among
elites and disproportionate private power.108
As for the system itself, although TransMilenio reigned in and controlled private
transportation operators, global influence helped private bus companies retain more power within
the system. In practice, TransMilenio S.A., coordinates private owners who operate the buses
and collect the fares. The CEO of TransMilenio is appointed by the elected mayor of the city
and the city government provides all necessary infrastructure (corridors, bus stops, bus stations,
garages, and pedestrian bridges) and monitors the system. The private companies retain 93% of
each ticket sale and while they technically do not have subsidies, they do benefit from the capital
investments made by the state. Many people believe the state deserves more of the revenues.
Fonseca et al. goes as far as to say that TransMilenio is really a monopoly of private bus
operators that take advantage of the government’s passiveness.109 While this view may be
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extreme, it not only shows a lack of faith in the municipal government, but also reflects the
relative strength of the private bus companies. In its effort to promote privatization, the World
Bank may have inadvertently favored dysfunction and contributed to global warming.
The power of private bus companies within the system not only makes the logistics of
running the system difficult, but also points to an interesting paradox within the public transport
system. As seen in Figure 6, according to a C40 assessment of Bogotá’s mayoral power over
various climate change issues, the mayor has the least authority over public transportation.
Despite the highly political nature of the transportation systems, the mayor has a relatively
limited ability to control the system and use it to improve their approval ratings. Thus, if a mayor
wants to show citizens that they are serious about improving public transport, it may be more
appealing to create their own system rather than attempting to assert authority over the existing
private powers in the institution.

Figure 6: C40 Assessment of Mayoral Power in Bogotá

Source: C40.org
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Conclusion
Weak municipal bureaucracy and low political consensus made Bogotá willing to uptake
the World Bank’s incentives for climate change governance in exchange for financial resources,
the institution's ability to create political consensus among the elite, and its reputation for
technical expertise. The multilateral institutions involvement in the creation of TransMilenio
successfully increased the accountability and technical capacity of the system as evidenced by
the way it encouraged planning and transparency, which helped lead to the initial success of the
system. However, the technocratic global governance risk led local leaders to favor technical
legitimation over democratic legitimation, which increased global favorability but, as Hunt
described, hurt the local relationship with the project.
Along with the technocratic risks, the case of Bogotá exhibited the political global
governance risks as demonstrated by the personalization and politicization that stemmed from
using the international institutions as a source of political legitimacy. Despite trying to create a
cultura ciudadana as early as 1996, the emphasis on the technical and global authority inhibited
TransMilenio’s ability to gain local support. Of course, the endogenous factors in Bogotá,
namely its relatively new democracy, its political structure, and its diverse population without
ties to the city, all contributed significantly to the low local support for the system. One could
even argue that the system is unpopular because it was both poorly designed and poorly managed
by citing controversies over overcrowding, sexual assault, and low-quality buses. However, this
research focuses on the global factors that contribute to low social investment not in attempt to
dispute any of these alternative explanations, merely to complicate them by offering a window
into the sometimes-obscured influence of global institutions in the local articulation of urban
projects.
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Moving forward, Bogotá’s earlier integration into these systems had two somewhat
contradictory effects. First, Bogotá did not initially need to legitimize or brand itself as fully
within the global system in this period because the multilateral governments provided them with
legitimacy through their programs. Second, the increased international focus on the system
created more scrutiny and bad press when issues from overcrowding to sexual assault began to
plague the system around 2006. The lack of legitimization to either local or global actors meant
that Bogotá struggled to generate the social transitions needed for effective climate change
governance. The next chapter will continue with this framework and use the Metro de Medellín
as a point of comparison to highlight the role of multilateral global governance in Bogotá and as
an introduction to the neoliberal risks for climate change governance in a multilevel global
system.
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Chapter Three
Medellín and the Neoliberal Risk of Global Governance
Introduction
While Bogotá forged closer relationships with global actors during a period where
multilateral institutions were actively promoting decentralization and engaging with cities,
Medellín sought to increase its globalness when multilevel governance led to new relationships
between both public and private actors. Public private partnerships, city networks, prizes
sponsored by private groups, higher FDI, and an increase in international conferences all created
new opportunities for cities to benefit from global engagement. The multiplicity of partners
created more competition within the system and cities like Medellín began competing to prove
themselves in capital markets just as any company would. Calvin calls this phenomenon “city
branding,” a phrase that emphasizes how cities have, in some ways, behaved like corporations in
the multilevel system.110 The similarity between cities and corporations also comes out in
literature that lumps cities and companies in the “subnational” actor category. Unsurprisingly,
this new global system and changing city behavior creates new global governance risks, namely
the neoliberal risk, which occurs when cities focus on branding at the expense of systemic
change.
This chapter will explore the neoliberal risk through the case of Medellín. It will start by
analyzing the development of the Metro, which occurred prior to Medellín actively engaging
with global governance. This history will both serve to define Medellín’s endogenous
environment and to highlight how multilateral governance in Bogotá resulted in the technocratic
and political risks that do not appear in Medellín. After establishing the endogenous
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environment, the rest of the chapter will analyze how the 2008 pivot to global engagement
through city branding drew out the neoliberal risks that are more prevalent in the multilevel
governance system. Finally, the chapter will look at how a strong social fabric in Medellín has
helped to mitigate some of the risks of global governance.

Endogenous Environment
Initial Crisis
As was the case with TransMilenio, the story of the Metro begins with crisis. Unlike
Bogotá, Medellín’s initial problem, or problems, centered around social control, extreme
violence, and restoring lost cultural capital. The nature of the crisis helps to explain why the
Metro developed its highly social nature. In Medellín, two crises defined the creation of the
Metro de Medellín: the initial economic crisis and the rise of cartel violence. The initial crisis
that triggered the Metro project came from the decline in industry in the 1970s and 80s; coupled
with Medellín’s fastest period of urbanization, it led to increasing economic trouble and rising
informal labor markets, especially drugs. 111 To counteract the economic contraction, in 1979,
Medellín established La Empresa de Transporte Masivo del Valle de Aburrá Limitada (EMVA),
commonly known as Metro de Medellín.112 The Medellín elite believed that a Metro would bring
about economic revitalization and saw the project as their ticket back to the top.113 In his
statement approving the Metro construction in 1982, President Betancur exemplified this thought
process saying: “the project was essential to restore Medellín’s lost dynamism and to open new
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horizons, to regain the leadership of Antioquia it had traditionally exercised.”114 In her work
analyzing the rise of cultura metro (Metro Culture), Stienen argued that the Medellín elite’s
moves to repair the social fabric of the city really began with the Metro itself.
The city’s financial situation, as well as its ties with the national government, helped
Medellín quickly secure a private loan for its metro; however, this speedy financing came with
corruption, according to Carlos Moreno, currently a senior advisor to President Duque, Moreno
noticed the corruption during his time as working for Antioquia’s governor, Alberto Vásquez.
The poorly executed initial financing resulted in the project depleting its funding ($655.4
million USD) by 1988 and stopping mid-construction. This pause in construction not only
wasted money, but also further destroyed any sense of local unity. Stienen argues that the Metro
project, designed to restore Medellín’s former glory, ended up generating criticism for its
perceived contribution to the peak in the cartel violence after the pause in construction left city
center in a state of disarray without creating new infrastructure.115
The combination of the economic decline with the rise in violence meant that Medellín
faced a more severe initial urban crisis than Bogotá that centered around complex social and
governmental issues. The degree of endogenous turmoil and the prominence of the drug trade in
Medellín made it an undesirable target for global loans, which in part explains the lower global
involvement. Medellín also received significant national attention as the national government
sought to regain control of the city. In solving this initial local crisis, the Medellín elite created a
transport system with a strong social grounding and restructured the endogenous environment.
The next sections will focus on explaining the endogenous environment before and after the
Metro with an eye to how these changes differ from those in Bogotá.
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Paisa Pride and The Medellín Elite
Interviewees and scholars alike sound almost jealous when they refer to the social
advantages granted to Medellín by their strong paisa identity claiming that it stems from the
similar geographic and racial profile of citizens in Medellín whose families have lived there for
generations. However, they often fail to mention that this homogeneity applies mainly to the
upper classes. Walking around in Medellín, the racial makeup does not differ greatly from that of
Bogotá. While Medellín is considered the whiter and more homogenous of the two cities, this
identity corresponds more with the elite and their culture than the city at large. As of 2015, 5.4%
of people in Bogotá identified as some type of afro descendant and 4.2% of people in Medellín
identified as afro descendant.116 While some amount of the social cohesion comes from
generation after generation living in the same area, overall, the “strong paisa culture” that
bogotanos so envy stems from the homogeneity of the elite who can then export this culture to
the lower classes and who can reach political consensus more quickly.
The elite in Medellín are some of the most powerful private actors in the country, and
many of them had ties to narcos. Their economic power initially developed during the 1950s and
the 1970s when Medellín was known as “the Manchester of Colombia,” as it was a powerful
industrial center with industrialization patterns that gave the city a culture of entrepreneurship.117
The elite also developed a culture of “Catholic corporatism,” which held that the elite and middle
classes have an obligation to protect the lower classes.118 While this sense of duty was not
enough to prevent Medellín from becoming the murder capital of the world in the 1990s, the
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loyalty of the elite to the city can be seen by the fact that throughout the period of violence the
elite retreated from the city center, but never left the city. This group is particularly important
because from the start, the success of the Metro hinged on the willpower of the Medellín elite. In
his dissertation, Ardila Gómez claims that the Medellín Metro was a failed project due to the
powerful coalition and their ability to keep a plan unchanged despite diverging stakeholder
interest.119
Despite studies finding the project was not feasible, both before and after the project was
approved, Medellín’s eagerness to complete a metro overcame the very reasonable doubt. Just
sixth months after President Betancur came to power, the mayor of Medellín submitted an
official funding request and the national government approved the metro project.120 The project
began under a design-build scheme, where the government holds an auction and the winning
firm, in this case a Spanish-German consortium, designs, builds, and finances the project. 121
When the project went bankrupt due to the poor planning, the refinancing process was so
difficult that the Spanish Government got involved. The final cost of the project had risen from
$654 million to over $2 billion.122 The initial phase was a fiscal disaster to say the least. Not only
Medellín is still paying off the debt, but the project resulted in the 1989 Metro Law, that, as
discussed, limited Bogotá’s ability to finance its own metro.
This history of President Betancur, who won on the promise to channel more funding to
Medellín, and his relationship to the initial project highlights the local and national political
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power of the Medellín elite.123 While Bogotá also has an important relationship with the national
government, the position as a capital city meant, that “unlike the country’s regional elites
[namely the elites of Medellín], the elite of Bogotá rarely link their political interests to the city
where they live—perhaps because their economic interests are played out on a national and,
increasingly, international stage.”124 The difference in social cohesion among the elite impacted
each city’s relationship with the national government as well as their ability to transpose their
social identity onto other citizens and create the sense of democratic legitimacy and local
engagement required for successful urban climate change governance. When assessing the
transportation system outcomes, this elite driven culture will be important for understanding
some of the realities in Brand’s assessment of the risks involved in neoliberal urbanism and city
branding.125

Fiscal and Political Autonomy
Local resources played a large role in Medellín’s political cohesion and ability to govern.
In comparison to Bogotá, and most municipalities, Medellín has historically had ample
municipal resources. Not only has Medellín collected more tax per capita than Bogotá, but they
also generated significant resources from semi-public companies.126 The larger pool of municipal
resources, pre-decentralization likely contributed to Medellín’s stronger local character and to
the strength of its public institutions when it came to public-private partnerships.
The most unique source of municipal revenue and municipal autonomy comes from
Medellín’s hydropower resources and its municipal utilities company, Empresas Públicas de
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Medellín (EPM), played a role in Medellín’s public finances and endogenous environment. Since
its founding in 1955 roughly 25% of the municipal budget has come from EPM. The market
structure, specifically the existence of unique actors like Industrial and Commercial State
Companies, a category of company that the citizens of Medellín lobbied for when utilities
companies in Colombia were being privatized.127 According to the EPM website an Industrial
and Commercial State Company “is endowed with legal personality, administrative and financial
autonomy and independent capital in accordance with Article 85 of Law 489 of 1998. In
connection with its acts and contracts, and as a utility company regulated by Law 142 of 1994,
EPM is governed by the rules of private law except as provided expressly in the Constitution of
Colombia, the law and other regulations.”128 Not only did EPM play a vital economic role, but
the citizen’s investment in the company speaks to an impressive expression of community
power: “The paisas, as the locals are called, cherish their utility: politicians mess with EPM at
their peril. ‘There is a massive social control of what we do,’ says Juan Calle, the firm’s chief
executive.” By control, he means citizen control of the company. However, because EPM
contributes so heavily to the municipality's budget and has garnered such international success,
EPM, like the Metro, seems almost above criticism. 129
The existence of companies like EPM shaped the structure of the Metro company, which
also qualifies as an Industrial and State Commercial Company. While the CEOs of both
TransMilenio and Metro de Medellín are appointed by local politicians, Metro de Medellín
operates more independently. Furthermore, TransMilenio coordinates private owners who
operate the buses and collect the fares, and the city government provides the infrastructure.
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TransMilenio, IDU, and the Secretary of Mobility work together closely. Metro de Medellín on
the other hand handles the infrastructure and the operation. The relationship between the Metro
company and the mayors appears to be strong. According to Dávila, “Mayors find the Metro
Company to be a partner focused on functional autonomy and financial stability.”130 This
relationship and allowed for CEOs of the Metro, like Ramiro Marquez, to have longer terms and
execute long term visions in comparison to their counterparts in TransMilenio.131 Medellín is
also unique in that the STIMVA company does not just serve the municipality of Medellín, but
50% is owned by the governor of Antioquia and 50% by Medellín. This co-ownership helps
depoliticize the transportation system in comparison with TransMilenio.
Not only does this structure provide larger municipal resources and, in theory, enable
Medellín to act more independently, but it is important to note that this structure creates a less
competitive economic environment. As with the social and political cohesion described in the
section, Medellín’s endogenous financial environment would indicate that Medellín has a
stronger endogenous ability to govern (at least once they resolve the cartel violence).

The Construction of Medellín’s Social Fabric: Metro Culture and Social Urbanism
The political and social crisis, stemming from the drug cartels, as well as the unique
culture of the Medellín elite influenced the construction of the system as a social project. While
Mockus tried and failed to construct cultura ciudadana in Bogotá as a solution to some of the
city’s problems, the Medellín elite utilized the Metro and created Metro Culture to successfully
unify the city. Stienen argues that the material interventions were related to the municipal
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government’s symbolic reconstruction of the city and were as much political projects as they
were tools for reducing violence and enhancing economic growth. This argument not only
emphasizes the social significance of the Metro, but also places the project well before the city’s
increase in global engagement thus emphasizing the importance of building a strong local culture
prior engaging in global-local partnerships as a buffer to global governance risks.
When the project was suspended, from 1988 to 1993, the municipal government had to
find a way to keep stakeholders, particularly the local community, engaged. The government
decided to started an awareness campaign with the help of the Colombian Industrial Bank.132
According to Stienen, this campaign was about more than the Metro, it was about returning to
the city’s industrial past and many compared the Metro to the city’s railway that helped its initial
industrialization.133 The material interventions of the Metro thus became as much of a political
project as an infrastructure project, and Metro Culture became a social ideal of order and civility.
The Economist cites Ramiro Márquez, ex-CEO of the Metro de Medellín, who describes the
Metro as “not only a means of transport but a statement of intent; it is clean, no graffiti, a
security guard on every platform, passengers are expected to queue, and some stations even have
libraries or concert venues.”134 Today Metro Culture has an entire section of their website
dedicated to discussing it. The website states that:
“The Metro Culture is understood as the result of the social, educational and cultural
management model that MEtro has built, consolidated and delivered to the city… Since
1994, the purpose of the Company was to generate a new culture among the people of
Valle de Aburrá, while consolidating relationships of trust with stations’ and Metro lines’
neighbors, in order to generate a sense of belonging and an attitude of caring and
preservation of the transportation system.”
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Other interventions during this period such as the Mesas de Concentración (public round
tables) and Open Forums, which included NGOs, trade unions, universities, local businesses, and
municipal representatives, helped to enhance local engagement and expand the circle of elite.135
Today most articles attribute Medellín’s miraculous turn around to Mayor Sergio Fajardo (20042008) and his social urbanism, a style of integrated and participatory urban upgrading that
emphasizes the idea that the elites have a responsibility to repay the “historic debt” owed to the
lower classes. However, as seen in Stienen’s work, the Metro and the Mesas de Concentracion
actually expanded the circle of elites who participated in the planning process and gave birth to
mayors like Sergio Fajardo and Alonso Salazar (2008-2012). In more ways than one, the
construction of the Metro exemplified the importance of engaging with and appealing to local
actors for creating a strong social fabric that in term helps increase the transport system’s longterm sustainability.

Implications for TransMilenio: Re-Examining the Technocratic and Political Risks
Prior to discussing Medellín’s relationship with the multilevel global governance, it is
important to highlight how the initial formation of the transport systems exemplifies some of the
costs and benefits of multilateral global governance interventions in Bogotá. The Metro Culture,
strong local planning coalitions, and the less political nature of the Metro all indicate that
Medellín benefited from developing its public transportation system more independently.
However, the benefits of technocratic global governance can be seen through the financial
disaster that defined the Metro’s early years. Compared with the numerous technical studies
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conducted in Bogotá, the Metro project moved forward with only one feasibility study done by
Mott, Hay, & Anderson, a British firm.136
Despite the initial corruption, the development of the system prior to the city joining the
global stage, contributed to a weaker focus on individual mayors in relation to the system and a
lower politicization of transportation in Medellín. In general, interviewees mentioned the mayors
by name more frequently in Bogotá than in Medellín. Even when referring to the current mayor,
interviewees in Medellín frequently said only “the current mayor.”137 During my six-hour
presentation and tour of the Metro de Medellín with Juan Alvaro, the lead sociologist, and
Alexander Castano, Mobility Specialist in the Planning Department, they highlighted how the
Metro works with each mayor and explicitly detailed each mayor’s contribution to the Metro.
Sergio Fajardo could be seen as a counterpoint to this trend given he has gained
international renown similar to that of Peñalosa, which makes sense as both mayors bring their
respective city much closer to global networks. However, because Fajardo did not create the
Metro itself and because the company is co-owned by the governor, Fajardo’s name becomes
associated with “social urbanism” and less with the Metro. The development of a public
transportation system with less politicization in Medellín both lends evidence to the impact of the
World Bank on the political nature of TransMilenio and reveals the importance of a lack of
politicization for creating a sense of local ownership.
Moving forward, remembering that the political and social changes that shaped the Metro
project and helped reduce violence in the city created an endogenous environment that allowed
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for strong and consistent local governance will be key to understanding Medellín’s relationship
with global actors.

Medellín and Multilevel Governance: Competition for Global Capital
As noted before, Medellín was not truly separate from the global market prior to its
concerted effort to appeal to global markets, but the level of global engagement was much lower.
As the violence in the city wound down in 2002 after the national government signed an
agreement with the paramilitary groups. As the violence wound down and Sergio Fajardo took
office, Medellín’s government began spending more as part of social urbanism.138 To pursue
these social urbanism policies, Medellín needed both short term capital and long-term capital, so
Medellín began to actively engage with the multilevel governance network. The nature of the
multilevel system encouraged Medellín to seek global recognition, or “symbolic capital,” from a
variety of global actors through city branding.
Brand identifies 2008 as the year Medellín began actively engaging with global
governance, which places its emergence in the wake of the financial crisis. After the crisis, the
global system went through a period of transition as multilateral institutions were dealt another
blow. The emergence waning power can be seen as the number of loans distributed by the World
Bank decreased compared to the 1990s and 2000s, just as foreign direct investment (FDI) and
overseas remittances increased.139 The transition empowered a variety of new global actors to
give out global governing incentives through both FDI and through normative measures. This
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change represented a break from the direct, often conditional, loans that defined multilateral
global governance during the development of TransMilenio.
The multilevel governance system at this time also demonstrates Foucault’s
governmentality and social control through internalized norms and increased accountability. This
focus can be seen as the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature gains more salience
during this period as well as private actors work to justify continuing with the neoliberal world
order by arguing that the soft-law and normative incentives given by multilateral institutions
successfully allowed for “social regulation of the economy” through CSR.140 While the
multilateral model rested its authority more in national governments and conditional loan giving,
this multilevel model emphasizes soft law incentives, goal setting, and competition. Drawing on
Foucault, Brand and Bulkeley argue that environmentality is a central characteristic of the new
political economy where eco-knowledge and enviro-discipline compel groups to stay within the
new world order.141
Before examining the ways that Medellín takes up global governing incentives and how
that contributes to the neoliberal global governance risks, it will be helpful to frame the city’s
actions and the neoliberal risk with the analysis of two prominent scholars on Medellín’s urban
development. Brand argues that because social urbanism both encouraged city branding and
became a key component of Medellín’s image, social urbanism’s goals become external and its
commodification weakens the social fabric of the city.142 Conversely, Dávila argues that, while
the elite espouses global discourses that indicate neoliberal policies to attract investment, they
must also continue to invest heavily in urban infrastructure and strengthen local democracy as a
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way to appeal to local legitimacy, because they recognize the high risk associated with losing
local confidence.143 Diving further into these theories reveals that both arguments contribute to
our understanding of Medellín’s experience with neoliberal risks of global governance.

Responses to Global Incentives in Medellín: Branding an Innovative, Green City
As noted in the introduction, Brand finds that links between environmentalism and
neoliberal urbanism create a competitive requirement of a “clean-green” city image to attract
“symbolic capital” in the form of prizes and international events and real capital in the form of
money, labor, and tourists, and to demonstrate the city’s global responsibility. The increased
emphasis on image and on environment in the global capital markets, as well as the increased
competition among cities, means that as Medellín looks to actively engage in the global system,
the municipality will mimic global rhetoric, namely market liberal ideologies and appeals to
efficiency, while also increasing its green rhetoric and promoting its environmental initiatives.
While official measures of “globalness” are limited, there are many indicators that
Medellín did indeed increase in globalness around 2008. The emergence of agencies like the
Agencia de Cooperacion y Inversion de Medellín (ACI Medellín) indicated that Medellín was
consciously seeking to increase global investment in the city. On ACI’s website, the director
states he coordinated the “internationalization” of Sergio Fajardo’s 2004 Development Plan and
this work led to the creation of ACI whose goal was to “establish international relations, so that
later it would be easier to attract investment.”144
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The language used by mayors also indicated a shift towards the global. The increased use
of terms that align with market liberal ideology and “good urban governance” serve as indicators
of Medellín’s city branding strategies. Sergio Fajardo (2004-2008) used the word “competitive”
32 times in his 286-page report. Alonso Salazar (2008-2012) used competitiveness in his title
“Medellín: Solidarity and Competitiveness” and it appeared 26 times in his 209-page document.
Anibal Gaviria (2012-2016) used the term 114 times in the 510-page document.145
The increase in global rhetoric is, of course, a feedback loop. More global engagement
results in the discourse being normalized and dispersed through multiple parts of the urban
network. Medellín’s international marketing capacity can be seen on through its websites and
statistics. While both Bogotá and Medellín have ComoVamos websites, Medellín’s has a tab
devoted to “internationalization.” As a whole, their government websites are more modern and
accessible. The government even has a statistics website that features an interactive infographic
comparing the latest Medellín development plan to the SDGs. During the presentation the Metro
de Medellín gave me during my interview in January 2019, the strategy map featured the same
graphic and verbal characteristics as the SDGs as seen in Figure 7 and 8. These rhetorical
strategies indicate that Medellín has bought into the global norms especially in discussing long
term planning key for securing investment.
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Figure 7: Metro de Medellín’s 2016-2020 Strategic Objectives Map

Source: Author’s Interview with the Metro de Medellín, January 2019.

Figure 8: Screenshot of the Mayor of Medellín’s Website MEdata.gov

Source: MEdata.gov
This type of rhetorical appeal extends past the Metro project. Figure 8 shows both the
green imagery inside Ruta N and the image of the Metrocable in the mural on the second floor.
This art in Ruta N, a leading incubator in Medellín, is particularly important as Calvin, explains
that the company itself is part of Medellín’s branding in that it leverages Medellín’s
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entrepreneurial heritage to attract capital.146 Consistent with the “clean green” city image, Figure
8 shows how the construction projects in Medellín are branded with an eye to green. These signs
stretched on for a few miles on one of the main highways in Medellín during my visit in January.
The signs say, “we are working for you,” and the tropical leaf pattern behind them presents green
imagery. This imagery is not only key for attracting global capital, but it also features heavily in
attracting tourism.
Figure 9: Photo from the highway in Medellín, January 2019 (Left). The inside of Ruta N,
January 2019 (right).

Source: Photos taken by Eleanor Jackson, January 2019.
During my visit to Medellín in January 2019, I also noticed the Metro appealing to
tourists in a variety of ways. First, the Metro was featured in an ad on the tourist map in our
Airbnb as an attraction, and the Avianca video advertising Medellín focused on the Metro.
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Second, one line of the Metro, Linea K, is dedicated entirely to tourism, though it has a higher
rate to compensate for that. On a more subtle level, the fact that, unlike TransMilenio, the Metro
has signage in English and Spanish indicates the system is built to welcome tourists. Brand goes
as far as to argue that the socio-spatial structure of the Metro does more to appeal to international
actors than to serve local people.147 He argues that the elegant cables allow tourists, international
experts, and journalists, to find a peculiar proximity to a distant world as they travel in a glass
box that glides silently over the rooftops of poor neighborhoods. While in some places, gliding
over rooftops would mean little, in the “land of eternal spring” many residents sat on their roofs,
often half dressed, as we glided over them. Additionally, the large windows or missing roof
sections occasionally made it seem as though someone lifted the lid off a house for us to give a
better view. The tour guide from my graffiti tour in Medellín confirmed the local discomfort with
this gawking. He told me that the main complaint residents have about tourists was that they no
longer felt free to hang out in their homes.148
The linkage between tourism and green terminology appears through analyzing
international news articles on the Metro de Medellín, where on average, the articles related to
tourism used more green words. Figure 10 shows further links between tourism and these
projects which further emphasizes the ties between tourism, branding, and the Metro.
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Figure 10: The Relationship Between Articles on The Metro Projects (PUI) and Articles
That Were Tourism Related

Source: Calvin, “Small Scale Global Ambition” (2014).
From the ways the municipal government appeals to global capital markets as well as
marketing by the Metro de Medellín, we see a level of global focus that supports Brand’s
warnings about the commodification of social urbanism. In general, Medellín’s city branding
heavily features the Metro de Medellín building off the Metro Culture and the local pride tied to
the system. The Metro and the Metrocables themselves have served as a major selling point not
just for local communities but also for international companies. In a 2014 El Espectador
interview with Jean-Marc Laforet, the head of French diplomacy in Colombia, he talks about
French private interests in Colombia in both highways and the Bogotá metro project. However,
he says that he gets the impression that “the Antioquenos work hard on the projects and there is a
strong alliance between all the businessmen, the civil society, and the universities… in terms of
urban transport, I get the impression that there is more organization in Medellín than in
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Bogotá.”149 This assessment as well as the reference to the Metrocables indicates the importance
of these projects in securing international investment. This quote also emphasizes how Medellín
outpaces Bogotá in global capital competition.
The increase in both agencies devoted to international engagement and in the overall use
of global correlate with the increase international prizes and events, two key incentives offered
by multilevel global actors. Medellín hosted the General Assembly of the OAS in 2008, the
South American Games in 2010, and the World Tourism Organization General Assembly in
2015.150 Medellín began receiving global awards. In 2013 The Wall Street Journal’s “Innovative
City of the Year” Award served as a particularly important seal of approval for the city and is
referenced in nearly every piece of international research or journalism on the city. In 2008, the
IDB began supporting the “Medellín model” of urban development.151 These awards and events
all indicate the success of Medellín’s city branding as they represent the “symbolic capital” that
cities compete for in the global market.
Both international scales and measures of actual investment indicate that Medellín has
been turning these symbolic prizes into real capital. On the “Index of Attraction of Investment”
Medellín rose from 30 in 2001 to 12 in 2013. Additionally, as seen in Figure 11, the share of debt
in the city registered to foreign currency has increased since 2012, indicating that it has been
capturing global lending.
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Figure 11: Medellín’s Share of Debt Denominated in Foreign Currency

Source: Moody’s Investor Service

Buffers to the Neoliberal Global Governance Risks: Medellín’s Social Superpower
Medellín’s city branding and appeals to global governance indicate a strong global focus
in many of the city’s projects. While the links between green images and neoliberal rhetoric are
clear, whether or not Medellín exhibits the neoliberal risks of global governance depends on two
things. First, has global engagement alienated citizens, decreased local participation, or
otherwise inhibited the social aspects of socio-technical transitions. Second, does green language
correspond with increased sustainability? To address the first issue, Dávila argues that part of
Medellín’s ability to avoid the potential risks associated with increasing global engagement
stems from the city’s experience with violence and inequality152. He finds that successive local
governments had no choice but to work together fill the major gaps in infrastructure and repay
the “historic debt” owed to the marginalized communities.153 Because elites recognize the high
risk associated with losing local confidence, they can espouses global discourses that indicate
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neoliberal policies to attract investment, while continuing invest heavily in urban infrastructure
and strengthen local democracy as a way to appeal to local legitimacy.154 As mentioned before,
Medellín’s ability to avoid the risks of global engagement also stems from the existence of a
cohesive culture among the political elite which they can then successfully export to other city
groups and can amend without rocking the boat.
Despite its appeals to international audiences, because the system was developed
independently of global engagement with an eye to solving local social inequalities and
increasing social cohesion, the Metro continues to appeal to the paisas, increasing local pride and
boosting local authority. Metro Culture has only grown stronger through time. Overall, the Metro
boasted that they had invested over 6.4 million pesos in to “Metro Culture” and 18.6 million
pesos into ecological support.155 The social cost of each project represents roughly 5% of the
total project cost according to Juan Alvaro, Head Sociologist for Metro de Medellín.156
During an interview with Juan Alvaro, he carefully detailed the socio-linguistic tools the
Metro uses to ensure community support. He emphasized the importance of setting up “official
communication” for every Metro worker so that the community cannot accuse the Metro of lying
due to a miscommunication. He showed many pictures of the Metro workers interviewing local
residents in churches and their homes emphasizing the importance of going out to them and
respecting their community spaces. Additionally, the importance of using terms like “we” and
calling the Metro card “civica” to evoke a sense of communal responsibility feed into the careful
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maintenance of local communities.157 Juan Alvaro also highlighted how the Metro consults with
local residents on what terminology they should use for different aspects of the cable cars. The
Metro also sends workers to teach kids about the system in school and hires local workers both
to construction and to run the stations. Additionally, the drivers for the Metro, the trams, and the
cable cars are all college students who receive scholarships for their work and many of them,
such as Alexander Castano, currently a Mobility Specialist in the Planning Department, end up
working for the Metro afterwards.
The Metro’s branding also extends to activists and art groups. As opposed to Peñalosa,
who takes a hard stand against graffiti, the government in Medellín works closely with graffiti
artists. Along the tram line constructed in 2015, the Metro hired graffiti artists through
Fundación Orbis to paint buildings along the tram line to help get the community involved in the
project and to make the route more beautiful.158 Based on ComoVamos statistics, articles,
conversations, and the local graffiti, these tactics appear to be working. In Medellín, poor
neighborhoods, like Comuna 13, have adopted the Metro along with the idea of sustainable
development. In 2012, researchers found that the Metrocables made residents prouder of their
communities.159 The influence of these ideas can also be seen in the street art, paid for both
independently and funded by the city, which references the Metro, the moving escalators, and
environmentalism. Figure 12 shows the transformation of the city featuring green hillsides (on
the right) and a painting of an elephant, one of the symbols of Medellín, with the escalator
project on one side and the Metrocable on the other representing the significance of the projects
(on the left).
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Figure 12: Photos of Graffiti in Communa 13

Source: Photos by Ethan Schuler on Free Zippy Graffiti Tour of Communa 13, January 2019
Metro Culture was not just symbolic. Along with emphasizing Metro Culture, the
Medellín government worked to integrate new groups into the policy making process through
social urbanism provided substantive local participation and increased democratic authority. The
revision 2006 Territorial Development Plans (POT) was co-written with universities, namely
CEHAP, and involved community-based workshops with management organizations like
Consejo Territorial de Planeación de Medellín and Empresa de Desarollo Urbano (EDU).160
Carlos Cadena, talked about how universities, like EAFIT, were hiring and protecting activists
like himself in order to incorporate them and their opinions into the policy system. The masters
students I talked to all submitted their research to the Metro de Medellín despite only citing one
project as coming from university research during my interview (the streamlining of the train
shape) they eagerly solicit all academic research on the company (including mine).161 In tandem
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with increasing civic engagement and partnerships, Medellín instituted participatory budgeting
where locals in the communas can allocate 5% of the city’s budget to projects of their choice.
This process is heralded as one of the “most innovative forms of city democracy anywhere.”162
Talking to the local guide of our Medellín graffiti tour, he corroborated the success of this
participatory planning when I asked him what he thought about the giant covered 384 meters
escalator project in Communa 13. He said the communa was allowed to vote on where to allocate
the municipal money for a new development project and they came up with the idea for the
stairs. The communa then felt further integrated into the project as locals were hired for the
construction. He credited its success in part to the participatory planning aspect. This practice
shows that Medellín still appeals heavily to local authority and democracy.
Despite these practices, the elite, government officials and businessmen, continue to have
the power to accept or reject the community input and, by incorporating dissenters into official
channels, they provide strong incentives for them not to rock the boat too much. While the
universities have protected researchers from backlash against certain critical news articles, the
idea that private companies may call up the university over slight criticism raises some alarm
bells for academics.
In Medellín, interviewees were hesitant to criticize the Metro or the government. For
instance, whenever Lina Lopez, founder of the Bici program and current C40 consultant,
criticized the Metro, she would quickly follow up with something positive that the Metro did.163
This trend held true for interviewees to varying degrees. While some might find the sense of
unity preferable to the negativity in Bogotá, the idea that criticizing the systems is taboo reveals
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a potential problem for the city and an undemocratic undertone. This problematic dynamic also
came out when Carlos Cadena, Academic Coordinator for Urban and Environmental Studies
(URBAM) at EAFIT, described the Metro’s reaction to one of the few protests the system
experienced.164 A group of poets entered the system and read poetry to disrupt the social order of
the Metro system. Carlos told me to Google it when I got home; however, my initial searches
(with my location set to Colombia and then to the US) yielded only stories about the day the
Metro allowed poets to come entertain the passengers. After years of violence and division, the
elite in Medellín appear to form a tight circle hesitant to critique as they work to bring the city
into their system again. While the practice of recruiting activists from universities and asking
universities to contribute studies to the government and the Metro has made a more cohesive and
well represented civil society, it also has helped create a system where people feel their voices
are heard, without that always being true. In Medellín, it seems the Metro looks to actively enlist
community and university members; however, it does not always listen.
While a sense of community and social cohesion is key to creating more environmentally
sustainable cities, simply exercising control over citizens does not necessarily mean that the
municipality will be able to more effectively govern climate change. Effective climate change
governance requires good communication between the citizens and the government and between
citizens of multiple classes. Medellín appears to have made strides in this effort, but some
aspects of paisa pride make it difficult to determine if local participation is genuinely strong, or
if, as Brand might argue, the global orientation of the city minimizes voices of dissent.
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Effects of The Neoliberal Global Governance Risk
Even with this social success, Medellín exhibits signs of Brand’s neoliberal risk of global
governance where symbolic action leads to inequality and obscuring problematic actors. While
the Metro appeals to green language, the city continues with a “bimodal” development plan that
promotes public and private transport infrastructure equally.165 The Metro has also struggled to
integrate with other modes of sustainable transit, especially bikes. This indicates an inconsistent
application of environmentalism that may stem from the power of certain private actors, namely
motorcycle companies. Finally, the way that officials focus on aspects of the system that
generate global praise, such as the operational financial sustainability, appears to align with
neoliberal risks.166
Beginning with “bimodal” development, Hidalgo and Cadena point to the contradictions
between words and deeds in Medellín and Bogotá.167 While Medellín began receiving more press
after the increase in globalness, Bogotá remained more sustainable in practical terms. According
to their findings, Bogotá reported a nearly three times greater share of trips on foot and by
bicycle (15%) than that of Medellín (6%). Bogotá had more participation of total trips in public
transport (67%) than Medellíns (57%). Additionally, although the Medellín Metro became one of
the flagship institutions of urban mobility in Colombia, TransMilenio-SITP completed many
more trips than both the Metro de Medellín and Metroplus (47% to 28%). In attempting to
explain why this difference exists, Hidalgo and Cadena identify motorcycles as a key problem
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finding that in 2014, motorcycle use increased three times more in Medellín (21%) than in
Bogotá (6%).168
While an increase in motorcycle use could be explained simply by their offer of cheap,
private, and fast transportation, the influence of business owners in Medellín’s public institutions
offers another explanation. Manuel Santiago Mejía Correra, the owner Colombiana de Comercia
SA (which manufactures motorcycles) holds the ears of the political elite and the boards of
Metro de Medellín, EPM, and Grupo Empreserial Antioqueno somewhat suspicious.169 In light
of his power, the city promoting “bimodal” transportation policies combined with the Metro
hesitating to integrate with bikes routes, could have a more sinister explanation.170 Full-fledged
corruption seems unlikely, but the size of motorcycle manufacturing’s contribution to the local
economy would be enough to create conflicts of interest even if Mejía Correra was not on these
boards. Regardless of the reasons, allowing both sustainable and unsustainable modes of
transport to develop simultaneously diminishes the overall sustainability of transportation. While
corruption would be a thrilling explanation, the mere existence of this trend indicates the
existence of the neoliberal global risk.
As was the case with technocratic authority not always aligning with local desires,
international accolades and financial market pressures may have a negative impact on citizen
satisfaction and system use. After the straightening out the initial financial crisis, the Metro de
Medellín became “operationally self-sufficient” meaning that is one of the few public
transportation systems in the world that can say it does not use government subsidies to cover
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operational costs. During my interview with Ramiro Marquez, ex-CEO of Metro de Medellín, I
asked him what he was most proud of and he cited this “financial sustainability” as one of his
two greatest accomplishments and recounted of World Bank members and other global actors
coming to him to ask for advice.171 The relationship between greatest accomplishment and
international validation that played out in Marquez’s story highlights he ways that global actors
have legitimized their position as metrics for success to the extent that it plays out in personal
pride.
When I later told this story to Diego Zappatta, a young transportation expert who
conducted studies on the Metro at EAFIT, he looked annoyed and stated that the high price of the
system prevented poor communities from attending the skill workshops offered by Ruta-N, the
largest incubator in the city, and that it is the government’s job to provide cheap and effective
private transportation.172 While he did not explicitly advocate for subsidies, he did argued that
the Metro and the local government should have done a better job of capturing the economic
gains that are generated through the increased economic activity in the areas around the stations
by implementing a new tax scheme. Zappata also argued that the waiting time for the cable cars
presents a major opportunity cost for the local people and went as far as to say that the pricing of
the Metro is less affordable than the Tube in London.173 This assessment supports Brand’s
argument that the MetroCable may be more for show than for impact
The tensions inherent in the neoliberal risk can also be seen in the abrupt termination of
Claudia Restrepo’s term (March 2015 to June 2016) as CEO of the Metro company. Carlos
Cadena described Claudia as young, progressive, environmentally conscious woman who shook
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up the company.174 Despite their focus on Metro Culture, Restrepo finally brought the company
to social media in 2015. More importantly, she also helped to increase the integration between
the bike and the Metro allowing bikes to enter the cars after years of back and forth over the
issue.175 While the terms of her resignation are hazy, they are rumored to have something to do
with conflicts between the governor and the mayor.176 When Restrepo stepped down, Tomás
Escobar, a vet of the Metro was appointed in her place. The decision to appoint Escobar raises a
few interesting themes. First, in the El Espectador headline announcing Tomás Escobar they
called him “the new head of Metro de Medellín, a technical man.”177 This call out of to the
“technical” aspect of Tomás indicates an appeal to the expertise that the TCCG work equates
with a typical global discourse. Second, the ousting of Restrepo, arguable the most
environmentally friendly and progressive CEO, indicates that the Metro values
environmentalism when economically convenient.
Looking at how individual citizens in Medellín value environmentalism ties these
examples of the neoliberal risk in Medellín. While creating social cohesion as a means to
increase civic responsibility and incentivize collection action is key for climate change
governance, conditioning citizens to care about climate change is also part of the social transition
required for good climate governance. Because elites interact more with global actors who
champion these environmental causes, they are more likely to value environmentalism. This idea
is confirmed by Medellín’s 2018 ComoVamos Citizen Perception Poll, which found that 8% of
upper class citizens believe the environment should be one of Medellín’s top priorities and only
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4% of lower class citizens do.178 The difference in upper and lower class perceptions indicate the
ties between environmentalism and neoliberalism, and show that the elite may take up an
environmentally friendly mentality themselves while struggling to extend it to the rest of the
city.179 This relationship, as well as the fact that neither group seems to value climate change
action particularly highly, serve as evidence that the multilevel governance incentives allow
actors to use green discourse without necessarily internalizing the values.

Conclusion
The case of the Metro de Medellín first helps to highlight the costs as well as the benefits
of Bogotá’s relationship with multilateral global governance institutions. To begin, the nature of
the crisis itself not only discouraged global actors from getting involved, but also necessitated a
social solution. The lower multilateral influence in Medellín further contributed to the social
nature of the Metro as the local government did not initially derive political and social legitimacy
from global actors. By the time Medellín began actively appealing to global markets, the Metro
project had already become one of the linchpins of the Medellín identity. Contrasting this case
with Bogotá emphasizes how a lower level of global governance also helped to leave space for a
strong social fabric.
With this initial social foundation, under Sergio Fajardo the city and the Metro worked
hard to legitimate themselves to both local and global actors. Based on the increase in both
symbolic and real capital, Medellín successfully gained global attention and projected a “clean
green” city image. While Medellín does not represent a true case of greenwashing, in part due to
the social buffers that Dávila highlights, the Metro does not project the values of environmental
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sustainability to its citizens as much as it does to international actors. This discrepancy, along
with other oddities such as the Metro using sustainable materials and tactics while also having a
tense relationship pedestrian and bike cultures, indicates that the city’s environmental concerns
take a backseat to their economic concerns.
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Chapter Four
Bogotá and the Neoliberal Global Governance Risk
Introduction
In light of the neoliberal governance risks exhibited in Medellín, returning to the case of
TransMilenio in 2016 reveals how the multilevel governance system has increased in influence
and spurred new change in Bogotá. As of 2014, Bogotá scored a 36 on the UN-Habitat City
Prosperity, a fairly weak score. Bogotá ranked especially low in environmental areas (a 3.6 out
of 100). 180 Medellín, on the other hand scored a 47 overall and scored much higher on
environmental issues with a 21.2%.181 While water and energy ratings were the same (7%), but
the air quality in Medellín was significantly higher at 35.5% as compared to 0.2% in Bogotá.
Interestingly, Medellín’s summary page lists numerous prizes, but there is no mention of prizes
for Bogotá’s page, despite the fact that Bogotá has won comparable international prizes. While
difference in score claims to show that Medellín has been more successful in implementing its
urban projects, particularly its environmental projects, the real difference in performance of these
two cities is highly debatable. This discrepancy in rating, and particularly the lack of prize
references in Bogotá’s profile, really shows how the in the multilevel system global institutions
have embraced Medellín. The emphasis on prizes speaks volumes to how this form of normative
governance can work to shift perception of a city and generate symbolic capital.
As this multilevel governance system gains importance, Bogotá must work to rebrand
and appeal to new global powers now that the advantages Bogotá had gained from international
institution’s support no longer guarantees their place on the world stage. Since his return to
office in 2016, Peñalosa has not only increased his global identity, but has also doubled down on
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his transportation investments. In implementing his new policies, Peñalosa not only follows
Medellín’s lead by implementing cable cars and a Metro, but also promotes Cultura TransMi,
clearly based on Metro Culture (Cultura Metro).
Comparing modern day Bogotá with the case of Medellín also highlights how the effects
of technocratic and political governance risks that decreased the initial benefits of local
governance, namely increased social investment, left Bogotá more vulnerable to the neoliberal
risks associated with this multilevel system. While Peñalosa’s decisions during his second term
benefit some sectors of society, the backlash against him shows a more pronounced neoliberal
global governance risk than in Medellín due in part to the fact that Bogotá never established the
same local participation or social consensus.

The Neoliberal Risk: Towards Local Authority or Global Capital?
Depending on which factors you look at, Peñalosa is either finally learning from the
initial mistakes in the system by putting an emphasis on cultivating local support through reemphasizing cultura ciudadana and following Medellíns lead, or Peñalosa has bought into the
neoliberal urbanism and city branding to the extent he is engaging in municipal greenwashing.
The question becomes, does Peñalosa learn from the past and truly listen to local opinion and
increase social engagement with the projects, or does he continue to fall into the traps of
engaging too much with global governance?
From a rhetorical standpoint, Peñalosa and his administrators appeal heavily to global
competition. In an interview with Andres Ortiz, the Head of Planning for Bogotá, he stated that
Bogotá’s goal was to be the city with the lowest carbon emissions in the world and proceeded to
describe the advantages, such as the temperate climate, that Bogotá had in making that a
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reality.182 This appeal to global competition aligns with Medellín’s city branding. While the
ComoVamos website for Bogotá does not yet have an international section, Peñalosa’s most
recent territorial development plan (POT) references international institutions and the SDGs
heavily and also includes numerous green terms.
The TransMilenio website itself balances global and local appeals more fully. The use of
political legitimation and international legitimation can be seen in the history of TransMilenio as
presented on its website. First, the history highlights a technocratic study done by the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) that found the cost would be higher on a Metro as a
way to justify using a bus rapid transit (BRT) system over a Metro system. This justification
aligns with a market liberal ideology and thus appeals to global authority. The history also
singles out Peñalosa with his own paragraph about the start of the system while the other mayors
are lumped into one. However, the description also invokes Antanas Mockus, the most popular
and respected of the local mayors, and his role in the project. In general, Mockus is more
associated with the implementation of the public bike system than of TransMilenio. Invoking
Mockus in this case indicates a need to appeal to local political power and brings us to the double
edged towards of invoking mayoral power.
Perhaps the biggest indicator of the Medellín Metro’s success in generating community
engagement is that in March 2019 TransMilenio updated their website to look remarkably
similar to that of the Metro and began featuring the hashtag “#CulturaTransMi,” as seen in
Figure 13. While this communication strategy appeals to global prestige by following Medellín’s
template for success, it also emphasizes local approval. The growing importance of local
investment is emphasized by TransMilenio’s partnerhsips with groups like Despacio, a local
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NGO that contracts with TransMilenio to help solve issues like sexual misconduct in the
system.183
Figure 13: Screenshot of TransMilenio’s Front Page, March 2019

Source: TransMilenio.com
When it comes to actual changes to the transport system, Peñalosa appears to tilt towards
the “greenwashing” end of the city branding spectrum. Apart from those interviewees directly
involved in the Peñalosa administration, people in both Medellín and Bogotá were skeptical of
Peñalosa’s new policies and particularly of his relationship with Volvo, a primary supplier of
buses. According to 2018 El Tiempo articles, the majority of the buses operating as part of the
TransMilenio currently are very old and would not meet environmental standards in Europe
(where they come from) or the US. 184 An article in El Espectador talks about Volvo defending
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its market share against Scania in 2018. 185 While TransMilenio struggles to get rid of diesel
buses, Metroplús, the BRT system in Medellín, has already taken the first step to implement
electric buses. The fact that Bogotá lags behind Metroplús seems particularly strange given the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) gave Bogotá funding for an electric bus fleet.186 This
scandal has drawn a lot of skepticism, even from Peñalosa supporters, due to the mayor’s close
ties with Volvo. Nothing represents the problematic nature of this relationship better than
Peñalosa’s Wikipedia page which features “Volvo” as one of his political affiliations.
Furthermore, projects like Peñalosa’s butterfly path, which would build a nature trail through
protected forest that surrounds the city, have been questioned by environmental groups for the
effect on the land itself. Even his party’s name “the green party” has been pointed to as an
example of the party’s attempts to come off as environmentally conscious while serving its own
agenda.
Perhaps the biggest potential change for both Bogotá and Peñalosa comes from the
decision to construction a metro. After over forty years of debating a metro project, the World
Bank issued a loan for Bogotá’s Metro Line 1 Section 1 project in August of 2018.187 The
question of the Bogotá Metro proves interesting given that metros are generally seen as a global
status symbol for cities, that it follows Medellín’s lead, and that it also panders to continued local
push for a metro project.188 The costly financial reality of a metro remaining the same as it
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always has been, the metro also continues to find the same popular support as seen in Figure 12.
Despite this support, during my interviews with city planners and ex-CEO’s of TransMilenio
would roll their eyes and say something along the lines of, “who knows” and “it’s been a long
time coming.” While this eye roll may have represented simple exasperation at the 40 plus year
debate over a metro in Bogotá, there also seemed to be a sense that building a metro was simply
giving into local demand. However, from an international perspective, the metro, and
TransMicable can be seen as projects that put Bogotá in an elite club of highly developed cities.
Figure 14: Local Opinions on the Metro de Bogotá

Source: BogotáComoVamos.com, “Encuesta de Percepción Ciudadana” (2018)
The metro project in Bogotá in some ways appears similar to the 2015 development of
the Tramvia (tram) in Medellín. The tram appealed heavily to both global and local ideals. The
review of the tram features photos of the 1922 tram in the city center. The Metro also sent me an
entire book titled, Entre Rieles y Cables, dedicated to the history of the city and the development
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of the original tram in Medellín.189 Complete with old paintings, copious sepia photos, and artful
quotes from prominent historical figures, this book situates the tram project as a piece of the
local history more than a global marvel. The simultaneously global and local appeals made by
these projects both underlines and undermines the concept of neoliberal governance risks. While
the emphasis on branding and global capital has increased in Bogotá, the need to sell the system
to local groups appears to be valued more evenly than before.

Conclusion
As noted in the second chapter, Peñalosa’s mayorship is in many ways emblematic of
Bogotá’s character as a global and exemplifies the pros and cons of using global governance as a
means of political legitimation. His current term highlights the initial risks associated with global
governance and his increased emphasis on cultura ciudadana. However, these initiatives can also
be framed through a city branding and good governance context, in which case, they are
motivated more by the multilevel governance system than by a move towards stronger local
governance.
While the true legacy of Peñalosa’s second term has yet to be determined, this analysis
leans towards the assumption that the multilevel governance system was the main motivator for
his actions. The new found need to actively promote the city incentivized Bogotá to improve its
legitimation strategies and emulate the Medellín model. Peñalosa’s low ratings, a continuing
dissatisfaction with TransMilenio, and the comparative admiration of Mockus, all reveal that
global backing does not help legitimate Peñalosa the way it once did. As Bogotá begins to appeal
to more the multilevel governance incentives, the controversies over Volvo, the accusations of
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greenwashing, and decision to go ahead to move ahead on the Bogotá metro, can all be
understood through the lens of neoliberal risks.
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Chapter Five
Conclusions and Future Work
Overview of the Argument: Insights for Climate Change Governance
A significant amount of scholarship has worked to explain why global and local actors
should be more involved in climate change governance. Thesis sought to take these theories a
step further and worked to conceptualize how global and local governance has combined to
deliver effective and sustainable public transportation in cities. Using the framework of global
governance risks, the past four chapters have addressed potential flaws in a “glocal” solution to
climate change by asking if global governance inhibits or even cancels out the strengths local
government can provide when addressing climate change? To help the answer to this question,
Table 6 gives an overview of the major features of each of the three cases.
Overall, these three cases demonstrate that multilateral global governance incurs the
political and technocratic governance risks, while multilevel global governance creates
neoliberal governance risks. Looking at Bogotá during the creation of TransMilenio reveals how
the multilateral global governance can create a more environmentally sustainable transportation
from a technical standpoint and help overcome collective action problems by encouraging
transparency. However, as the city struggled to follow through on the initial plans for the system,
the innovative BRT system became an overcrowded, over politicized point of tension with low
local support. The political risk helps explain this failure as the system became tied to Peñalosa
and the World Bank due to their need to establish their respective governing authority. These ties
made the system overly political while also decreasing a sense of local ownership. The political
risk combined with the technocratic risk encouraged city elite to place the global above the local
as they negotiated between divergent interests.

96

Table 6: Case Overview
Bogotá (1996–2006):
Political and Technocratic
Risks in the Creation of
TransMilenio

Medellín (2008-Present):
Neoliberal Risks and
Social Urbanism

Bogotá (2016-Present):
Neoliberal Risks and
Cultura Ciudadana

Key System
Features

TransMilenio- Bus Rapid
Transit (BRT), Private Bus
Companies Contract with
government, CEO appointed
by Mayor

Metro de Medellín, Metro
Culture (Pre-Increase in
Globalness), Metrocable,
Tramvia
(50% Mayor, 50%
Governor)

TransMiCable,
CulturaTransMi, Metro
de Bogotá, Electric Bus
Problems

Crisis

La Guerra Centavo (The
Penny Wars)

Economic decline to a rise
in cartel violence and elite
retreat

Low support for
TransMilenio + Rise of
Medellín

Endogenous
Environment

-Poor municipal bureacracy
-Social, cultura ciudadana
+ Decentralization, Taxes

+ Paisa pride
+ Social Urbanism
+EPM, High Taxes

+/-cultura ciuadana
-“Adam and Eve
Complex”

Type of
Global
Governance

Multilateral (World Bank +
IDB)

Multilevel (SpanishGerman Consortium,
Innovative City of the Year)

Multilevel (Remaining
multilateral, but new
focus on private)

Strengths and
Weaknesses

+ Bici, Ciclovia, coordination
with other systems
+ Strong planning
- Protests, “Adam and Eve”
complex

+ Participatory Budgeting
+ Metro Culture
+Green Imagery
-Bike system, Motorcycles
- Elite value global > local

+ Implements new
projects
+ Focus on Cultura
Ciudadana
-Volvo scandal
-Low political support
-“Greenwashing”

Source: Eleanor Jackson
The case of Medellín highlights the neoliberal governance risk of prioritizing symbolic
action to the point of discouraging or impeding real action and allowing elites to quietly profit
from unsustainable production models as accountability spreads too thin. The city’s decision to
fund highways and public transit, the Metro’s role in promoting Medellín’s “clean green” image
and encouraging tourism, and the Metro’s hesitancy to integrate with other modes of sustainable
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transit, all correspond with the neoliberal risk. However, Medellín’s story also reveals the
importance of the endogenous environment as the cultivating of social cohesion through Metro
Culture and the use of planning tools, like participatory budgeting, help the city balance the
global and the local. This strength becomes particularly noticeable when comparing the
Medellín’s experience with multilevel governance to Bogotá’s current situation. Under Peñalosa,
Bogotá has begun to exhibit signs of succumbing to the neoliberal risks as evidenced by the
Volvo controversy. The weaker social fabric in Bogotá has left the city more susceptible to the
global governance risks.
When it comes to implementing sustainable transportation and the potential pitfalls in
these projects, we see that the elite in a city are responsible for negotiating global and local
conflicts of interest and they often fall prey to global governance risks that decrease long-term
sustainability and obscure other local issues. Regardless of the type of governance risk, all three
cases show that an increase in “globalness” tends to correspond with an increase in sustainable
discourse, in appeals to market liberal ideology, and in the power of private corporations and
elites. The link between the global and the green becomes particularly important in
understanding the complexities of understanding and constructing authority in the new global
system. Global actors have used climate change to construct their moral authority in the new
world order and used their financial power to influence local action. Within the global regime,
cities have effectively become clients competing for funds. In both Bogotá and Medellín, urban
environmental concerns resonate with local actors, but find far more influence among the global
and the elite. While citizens in Bogotá have begun to care more about air pollution, in part as a
response to the Volvo bus scandals, in general the transport companies and local governments
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promote the sustainability of the public transport system to global audiences while local actors
remain more concerned with security, price, and convenience.
The key question moving forward in this work consists a complex moral dilemma. How
can we overcome the real challenges created by climate change while environmentalism is
increasingly used to legitimize environmentally unfriendly actors and obscure the origins of
these issues? While this thesis did not provide a solution to that question, it worked to further
articulate the costs and benefits of different governance tactics and reiterate the importance of
continuing to look for solutions to this paradox.

Weaknesses in the Theoretical Framework and Questions for Future Research
Of course, this theoretical framework still has many weaknesses. First off, this
framework downplays the historical factors at play in these issues, which makes it more difficult
to explain some of the local complexities of governance and their relationship to longstanding
global networks. I attempt to bring in some historical factors from both in analyzing the cities
and developing governance framework; however, a fuller analysis would weave these factors in
more fully. This work also entirely ignores the role of national governments in governing over
climate change issues. While they are implicitly part of the story due to their influence on both
the autonomy of urban governance and the power dynamics of global governance, a full analysis
of the effects of global and local interactions on climate change governance would both articulate
the national government's role to provide more specific arguments as to why or why not the
national government should act as an intermediary between the vertical governance levels.
With more time, I would carry out my initial plan to conduct a well-grounded discourse
analysis similar to that in TCCG using the language found POTs, newspapers, advertisements,
company/institutional reports, and interviews. To understand at how these actors, construct their
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authority linguistically in comparison with how other actors interpret and uptake their authority,
a substantive and careful analysis of both quantitative and qualitative linguistic data is necessary
to fully unpack how climate change governance is differently employed across groups. This
more extensive and systemic discourse analysis would not only be fruitful for tracking power
dynamics, but it could also help to better clarify the role of media in the cities. The role of media
appears particularly important in these cases given the paisa pride that discourages the Medellín
elite from criticizing their city. When thinking about this discourse analysis, it would be
important to draw in as many interviews as possible given that focusing on written text and
formal plans from both local governments and global institutions creates a bias towards global
and elite systems as the outward facing and edited material is often designed for them.
Finally, going forward, sharpening the evaluation of the environmental outcomes will be
a major challenge given the measures of success are entirely baked into the global governing
systems and people still contest even the most well-established metrics. Similarly, measuring
“globalness” in cities is incredibly imprecise and many of the metrics favor financial flows.
Defining stages of globalness and degrees of globalness while useful, may inadvertently imply
that these areas were not always part of some larger global networks. Finally, using words like
“response” when looking at how cities interact with global governance may signal that the city
acts in response to these groups when in fact many of the examples in these cases are part of a
feedback loop.
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Appendix A: Interviews
1. Andres Ortiz- Head of Urban Planning for Bogotá, connected by Carlos Moreno, advisor
to President Uribe.
2. Angelica Castro- Ex CEO TransMilenio, connected through Astrid Martinez
3. Ana- Advocates for the rights of graffiti artists, works for the cities most popular graffiti
tour, degree in political science, met on graffiti tour
4. Astrid Martinez - Ex CEO of TransMilenio, currently works at a Fedesarollo, a local
think tank, connected to me by Ethan Schuler, fellow Colby Senior, who interviewed her
for his thesis as well.
5. Carlos Cadena - PhD on Sustainable Urban Transporte, works for URBAM (the urban
environment research center of EAFIT that frequently contracts with the government on
urban development projects) founder of Ciudad Verde a big environmental NGO in
Bogotá and Medellín (SUPER willing to help), connected through Professor Julio Dávila
(professor at University College London)
6. Diego Zapata- Works at EAFIT and has conducted studies for the expansion of the metro,
now does AI at Ruta N, one of the largest entrepreneur hubs in Medellín, connected
through Emmanuel Ospina.
7. Emmanuel Ospina- Masters student at URBAM working on biking and pedestrian rights,
cold email.
8. Fernando Rojas- PhD on TransMilenio, huge transportation activist, currently working
for a PR firm as a retraining time. (SUPER willing to help), connected by Zoraida Rueda
9. Ingrid Joanna Portilla Galindo, Director of Transport and Infrastructure for the Secretary
of Mobility connected by Nancy Sanchez
10. Juan Alvaro, Head of Sociology, and Alexander Castano, Mobility Specialist in the
Planning Department, they spent 3 hours giving me presentation and 3 hours taking me
on a tour of every aspect of the metro, connected through Rodrigo Puyo, prominent
lawyers in Medellín.
11. Laura Rodriguez- Member of NGO Despacio, did a masters on TransMilenio, they have
worked with TransMilenio on promoting women’s rights and safety, cold emailed.
12. Lina Lopez, co-created the city’s bike program, currently works for C40, connected
through Carlos Cadena.
13. Ramiro Marquez- CEO of Metro de Medellín for 14 years, solved the financial
controversy with the Spanish/German group, connected through Carlos Moreno, advisor
to President Duque.
14. Zoraida Rueda - City Council Bogotá, connected by Nancy Sanchez, journalist and
former Oak Fellow
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Appendix B: Examples of Green and Neoliberal Terms
Green Terms

Neoliberal Terms

Bikes

growth

Emissions

Competitive, Efficient

Verde

Innovative

Ecoeficiencia

Statistics

Eficiencia

cost effective

Medio Ambiente

Development, developing

Calidad del Aire

Any Global Institution or
Company

Aire

Free Trade

Pollucíon

globalization, foreign affairs

Electrico

"liveable cities"

Sostenibilidad

public goods

Sostenible

the Enlightenment

Ambiental

economic laws

“Ciudad Verde”

Any US university

Limpia

neoliberal

Civolica

"liveable cities"

cycling/walking

public private partnerships

These words come from the literature and from a statistics project I conducted this semester that
surveyed the relationship between green and neoliberal terminology in 80 randomly selected
articles on TransMilenio and the Metro from 2008 to the present. I did not include the results in
this paper due to the small amount of data collected; however, building out this dataset would be
helpful for any future research.
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Appendix C: Mayors and Presidents
President

Bogotá

Medellín

Julio César Turbay Ayala
(1978-82)

Hernando Dúran Dussán
(1978-82)

Belisario Betancur Cuartas
(1982-86) (Medellín)

Augusto Ramirez Ocampo
(1982-84)

Jorge Valencia Jaramillo
(1978-79)
Bernardo Guerra Serna
(1979-81)
Jose Jaime Nicholls (198182)
Alvaro Uribe (1982-82)
Juan Gaviria Gutierrez (198384)
Pablo Pelaez Gonzalez (198486)

Virgilio Barco Vargas (198690) (Bogotá and World Bank
connections)
César Gaviria Trujillo (199094) (enemy of Escobar)
Ernesto Samper Pizano
(1994-98) (Bogotá)
Andres Pastrana Arango
(1998-2002)
Alvaro Uribe Velez (20022010) (Medellín) (Colombia
First)

Juan Manuel Santos Calderon
(2010-2018) (National Unity)
(Bogotá) (Family owned
ElTiempo)

Ivan Duque Marquez (2018Present) (Democratic Center)

Hisnardo Ardila
(1985-86)
Julio César Sánchez
(1986-88)
Andres Pastrana Arango
(1988-90) *First Elected*
Juan Martín Caicedo Ferrer
(1991-92)
Jaime Castro (1992-94)
Antanas Mockus (1995-96)
Paul Bromberg Silverstein
(1997-98)
Enrique Peñalosa
(1998-2000)
Antanas Mockus
(2001-2003)
Luis Eduardo Garzón
(2004-2007) (PDI,
Independent Democratic
Pole)
Samuel Moreno Rojas (20082011) (removed for
corruption)
Gustavo Petro Urrego 20122014 (Guerrilla past)
2 Acting Mayors
Gustavo Petro Urrego (20142015)
Enrique Peñalosa Londono
2016-Present

William Jaramillo Gomez
(1988-1990)
Omar Florez Velez (1990-92)
Luis Alfredo Ramos (199295)
Sergio Naranjo (1995-98)
Juan Gomez Martinez
(1998-2001)
Luis Perez Gutierrez (20012004)
Sergio Fajardo (2004-2008)

Alonso Salazar (2008-2012)
Anibal Gaviria (2012-2016)

Federico Gutierrez (2016Present)
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